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No. 80-1146 
ZOBEL et ux. 
v. 
WILLIAMS, Alaska Comm'r Rev. State/Civil Timely 
~ 1. SUMMARY: Unlike most s t ate governments, the 
~ ~a~e of Alask~' has more mone~~a/ It therefore 
tv /l?'p adopted a plan to give~ mu~ of its money to its residGnts. 
The amount of money received by any individual is ~ function of 
the numbe r of years the individual has 1 i ved in the ·state. 
~""t4 
ULVL· ~~ c_-. 
The 
L.o 
question is whether this system of distributing money violates 
equal protection or is an unconstitutional infringement on the 
right to travel. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Alaska is blessed with 
vast natural resources which now are being de"{eloped. Rents, 
royalties, and lease sale proceeds are flowing into the State's 
coffers at a staggering rate. In 1976, Alaska adopted a 
constitutional amendment establishing something called the ------- ----Permanent Fund. Alaska Const. art. IX, s~c. 15. Proceeds from 
natural resources are placed in the Fund. Under the 
constitutional amendment, the principal of this Fund may~ be -----
appropriated by the legislature for any purpose. Qnl,_y the --earnings from investment of the principal may be used for -
government programs. 
The Fund's annual .1_ield is itself a huge amount of 
money, far more than the state legislature wishes to spend for 
services and programs. In April, 1980, the legislature enacted 
I I \l 
a dividend program that each year distributes to State 
residents some of the Fund's yield. Act of April 15, 1980, 
~rinted in Juris. Stmt. at 60a-70a. For the first year of 
the program, each dividend unit is worth $50. Id. § 3, 
reprinted in Juris. Stmt. at 69a. Under the program, each 
state resident is entitled to one divi dend unit for each year 
of residence in Alaska. For example, a person who had lived in 
~Alaska since 
YJ-tl'/ the program; 
statehood would get $1,050 in the first year of 
a one-year resident would get only $50. •rhe 
total planned disbursement for the first year of the 
$130 million. 
In establishing this program, the 
several statements of policy and findings of fact. First, it 
concluded that "there exis ts in the state a serious problem of 
population turnover," which leads to "political, economic, and 
social instability." .!.~· § l(e), reprinted in Juris. Stmt. at 
6la. The dividend program therefore was designed "to encourage --
persons to maintain their residence in Alaska and to reduce 
population turnover." Id. § 1 (b) (2), reprinted in Juris. Stmt. 
at 6la. Second, it stated that it intended "to encourage 
increased awareness and involvement by the residents of the 
( state in the management and expenditure of the Alaska permanent 
fund." Id. § l(b) (3), reprinted in Juris. Stmt. at 6la. 
Third, it declared that the award of dividends "based on full 
years of residency fairly compensates each state resident 
for his equitable ownership of the state's natural resources." 
Id. § l(c), reprinted in Juris. Stmt. at 6la. 
Appts, who are recent Alaska residents, sued in the 
state trial court contending that the dividend program violated 
equal protection and the constitutional right to travel as well 
as provisions of the state constitution. The trial court held 
the program unconstitutional, but the Alaska Supreme Court 
.reversed. That court noted that the l aw was not exactly a 
durational residence requ(rement·, because all Alaska residents 
were entitled to some benefits. Juris. Stmt. at lla. The 
4. 
court acknowledged, however, that the measure of benefits was a 
function of the duration of residence. Id. It turned then to 
the scope of judicial review. Language in early Supreme Court 
cases suggested that durational residence requirements were to 
/ 
be judged under th~ "strict scrutiny" test. Dunn v. Blumstein, 
405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972), quoting Shapiro v. Thorn~, 394 U.S. 
618, 634 (1969). The court noted, however, that Memorial 
Hospita~ v. MaricoEa County, 415 u.s. 250 (1974), and Sosna v. 
Iowa, 419 u.s. 532 (1975) , stated that some durational 
residence requirements would not penalize the right of 
interstate migration, and thus not provoke strict scrutiny. 
415 u.s. at 256-59. The court thus undertook to consider 
whether the law was entitled to the deferential review hinted 
f 
at in Sosna and Memorial Hospital. It identified four factors 
that made a statute susceptible to strict scrutiny: (1} 
whether the state's basis for the residence requirement \Jas 
mere budgetary, recordkeeping, or administrative concerns: (2) 
whether "basic necessities of life" were at issue; (3) whether 
the law absolutely denied,. as opposed to delayed, receipt of a 
benefit; and (4) whether "fundamental rights," such as the 
right to vote, were abridged. In light of these factors, the 
court concluded that, "although the question is not a clear 
one," Juris. Stmt. 12a, the law had to meet only the rational 
basis test. 
The court then discussed the three interests asserted 
( 
by the state. See statutory summary supra. The Court 
~. 
concluded, first, that the state legitimately could create a 
financial ince ntive for individuals to establish and maintain 
residence in Alaska. Exce s sive population turnover has 
presented problems in Alaska's past. Second, it thought that 
Alaska was entitled to use the graduated scale of benefits to 
encourage prudent management of the Permanent Fund. The court 
noted that a per capita benefit system would provide incentives 
for risky management of the Fund and unwise us e of natural 
resources. That is so because, as population increases, per 
capita benefits would decline. Thus, cur rent residents would 
have an interest in (a) speculative investments that would 
yield quick returns, and (b) rapacious development of natural 
resources to maximize the Fund's principal. Third, the court 
said that the state legitimately could apportion benefits in 
recognition of the "contributions of various kinds, both 
tangible and intangible, which residents have made during their 
years of state residency." 
In conclusion, the court held that the scheme 
survived federal and state constitutional challenge because the 
"purposes put forward by the state are legitimate and 
sufficiently weighty, and that the classification system has a 
fair and substantial relationship to these purposes." Juris. 
Stmt. 35a. 
Justice Burke wrote a brie f concurring opinion, 





plan were overcome by his belief that the court's role was not 
to second-guess the legi s lature's finding s and conclusions. 
Justice Dimond dissented for hims elf and Justice 
Matthews. In brief, he concluded that this case was unlike any 
durational residence requirement upheld by the Supreme Court, 
because this was an unl i mited durational residence requirement. 
It was impossible for a new resident ever to catch up with an 
old resident. The dissenters noted that only "reasonable" 
residence requirements had been upheld in prior Supreme Court 
cases. This one must be unreasonable, because it is perpetual. 
After the state supreme cour t's decision, appts 
sought a stay from this Court. Justice Rehnquist granted a 
temporary stay and referred the matter to the Conference. On 
l 
November 17, 1980, this Court entered a full stay of the lower 
Court's judgment (A-385; Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appts contend that the only 
durational residence requirements approved by this Court are 
brief, "reasonable" periods necessary to establish bona fide 
residency. The Alaska law in this case, by constrast, creates 
"a perpetual disparity in treatment between the citizens of a 
-----~ 
State solely on the basis of length of residency." Appts point 
- -out that the Alaska Supreme Court itself has a confused 
position on issues of this kind. In a _companion case to this 
one, Williams v. Zobel, No. 2170 (Alas. S. Ct. Sept. 19, 1980) 
[not pending here] , the Alaska Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional a scheme to exempt persons who had filed three 
or more returns from the state income '..: ax. Appts say it is 
( 
I 
ludicrous that Alaska cannot constitutionally exempt long-term 
residents from taxation but be permitted to preferentially give 
them the money to pay their taxes. Appts say, in sum, that the 
state cannot constitutionally create a disparity in treatment 
among bona fide residents of the state. The state's claimed 
interests, even if perm~ssible public purposes, are not so 
significant that they support an unending residence requirement 
of this sort. The sch~me is so egregious that summary reversal 
is justified. 
The state has filed a motion to dismiss or affirm 
that essentially tracks the reasoning of the state supreme 
court. The state argues that the law does not burden the right 
to travel; if anything, it creates an incentive to move to 
Alaska. The rational basis test is applicable because the law 
does not deny necessities of life or infringe on fundamental 
rights. The program is constitutional because it plainly bears 
a fair and substantial relation to the state's interests. 
4. DISCUSSION: Appts have a substantial argument 
that the Alaska statute unconstitutionally imposes an 
unreasonable, open-ended durational residence requirement. - I 
can find :10 prior case that has considered whether a state 
constitutionally may distinguish among residents, based on the 
date of their migration, in perpetuity. Earlier cases only 
~ 
discussed whether a state could impose a threshold period to 
establish bona fide residence. 
I would note probable jurisdiction. 
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm. 
02/13/81 Cane Opn in petn. 
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April 17, 1981 Conference 
Supplemental List 
No. 80-1146 
ZOBEL, et al. 
v. 
WILLIAMS, etc., et al. 
Motion of Appellants to 
Waive Filing of Joint 
Appendix 
SUMMARY: Appellants move to dispense with the Rule 30.7 
requirement that a joint appendix be printed. Appellees join in 
the request. 
Appellants maintain that the case has been presented on an 
agreed set of facts, and that there has been no factual record 
developed below that would aid .the Court. 
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This case poses a finely balanced question as to the 
application of the Court • s past right to travel cases. In 
several respects the durational residency requirement here 
appears to work only a limited infringement on the right to 
travel. The requirement does not divide the state's residents 
into two sharply defined classes of newcomers and oldtimers 
but rather distinguishes between all residents, long- and 
short-term alike, on the basis of how long they have lived in 
the State. The scheme does not flatly deny a state benefit to 
newcomers but rather provides part of the benefit to all 
residents, no matter how new, with the promise that each year 
will bring a greater share. We deal not with the right to 
vote or to welfare or to any other vital state service 
commonly available from the states, but with the distribution 
of the State • s oil revenues through means of a unique cash 
gift from the State to its citizens. 
Yet, from another point of view, the durational 
residency scheme here may appear more troubling. It is a 
scheme that creates a permanent set of durational distinctions 
for all residents, not one that seeks to identify bona fide -
residents and then treat them all equally. Most troubling, it 
is a scheme that may be replicated in a multitude of ways, r f:r'tAA-f -
throughout the wide realm of government services, not one that 
can easily be limited by some peculiarly strong state 
interest. If this plan of distribution is upheld by the 
3. 
Court, may the states, or indeed the federal government, 
condition entrance to national parks or museums, eligibility 
for state educational prizes, bus fare, or tax deductions, 
upon length of residency in the nation or the state? 
The Court must decide: (1) whether the Alaska 
distribution scheme infringes upon the right to travel and how 
seriously; and (2) if the right to travel is infringed 
whether the State's interests here are sufficient--under 
whatever standard of review the Court choses--to justify the 
infringement. 
Background 
A. The Statutory Scheme 
In 1977, blessed with an oi 1 bonanza, the citizens 
of Alaska adopted a constitutional amendment creating the 
Permanent Fund. The amendment directs that at least 25% of 
all mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, 
federal mineral revenue sharing payments and bonuses received 
by the State are to be placed in a fund. The principal of the 
Fund is inviolate; only the investment earnings from the Fund 
are available for government programs. The purpose of the 
Fund is twofold: ~~t ,. to assure that ongoing government 
programs can be supported in the future and do not become 





the temptation to use oil revenues to create new and wasteful ~ 
government programs. 







Permanent Fund Statute, AS 43.20.010 (Ch 21, SLA 1980), under 
which 50% of the earnings from the Permanent Fund is to be 
returned each year to state residents in the form of cash 
dividends. Under the distribution, each resident receives one 
dividend for each year of residency since 1959, the year 
Alaska became a state. Thus, a resident of thirty years 
receives twenty-two dividends this year and twenty-three 
dividends next year. A resident of six months receives one-
half of a dividend. The dividends are calculated by dividing 
the amount of the income to be distributed--one-half of the 
income from the Permanent Fund--by the total number of 
dividends to be distributed.l In 1980 the value of a 
dividend was fixed at $50. Had the distribution not been 
enjoined by the Zobel's legal action, a resident from 
statehood would have received $1,050 (twenty-one dividends) 
while a resident of a year would have received the single 
dividend of $50. 
At the same time that the legislature enacted the 
Permanent Fund Statute, it also passed into law a state income 
tax exemptioE statute. Under this measure, residents who filed - --... 
state income tax returns for three years were immediately 
exempt from any further state income taxes. Those residents 
lrf this calculation yields a figure of less than $50, the 
legislature must appropriate money from the general fund to 




who filed for two years were to pay only one-third of their 
income tax, while those who filed in one previous year were 
exempted from one third of their tax. The tax exemption 
statute is not before the Court on this appeal but was also 
the object of the Zobels' attack. 
The Zobels have been residents of the State since 
1978. They filed suit in state superior court on April 28, 
1980, seeking a declaration that both the tax exemption 
statute and the Permanent Fund statute were unconstitutional. 
The superior court held that both statutes violated the right 
to equal treatment under the Alaska Constitution and enjoined 
the state from making any distributions from the fund under 
the durational residency scheme. On appeal, the State Supreme 
Court affirmed the lower court's finding that the tax 
exemption statute violated the state constitution. Williams 
v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1980) (Dimond & Matthews; 
Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring; Connor & Burke, dissenting). 
Immediately thereafter the state legislature completely 
abolished the state income tax. However, the State Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court's holding that the Permanent 
Fund Act violated the state equal protection clause and held 
further that neither did the Act violate the federal right of 
interstate migration. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448 (Alaska 
1980) (Rabinowitz, C.J., & Connor; Burke concurring; Dimond and 
Matthews, dissenting). Chief Judge Rabinowitz cast the 
deciding vote in each of these decisions. we stayed the 
6. 
mandate of the Alaska Supreme Court on October 28, 1980, 
pending timely filing and disposition of this appeal. 
B. The Opinion Below 
The court began its inquiry by searching for the 
appropriate standard of review. Language in Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,2 might indicate that strict scrutiny 
was always triggered by durational residency requirements. 
However, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) and then 
in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) 
the Court indicated that durational residency requirements 
that did not "penalize" the exercise of the right of 
interstate migration would not be strictly scrutinized. 
Moreover, strict scrutiny was not the standard applied by the 
Court in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), the Court's most 
recent examination of a durational residency requirement. 
In determining whether strict scrutiny ought be 
applied, the Alaska court identified four possible factors on 
the basis of this Court's opinions. First, Sosna indicates 
that strict scrutiny is applied when the state seeks to 
justify the durational requirement solely because of 
2 "In sum, durational residence laws must be measured by a 
strict equal protection test: They are unconstitutional unless 
the State can demonstrate that such laws are 'necessary to 
promote a compelling governmental interest.'" 405 U.S. at 342 
quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis 
in original) . . • " 
7. 
administrative, budgetary, or recordkeeping needs. But here 
the State has put forward other justifications. Second, 
Maricopa County suggests that if the benefit denied to new 
residents is a "basic necessity" of life--e.g. welfare or 
medical care--then strict scrutiny will be aplied. But again, 
the requirement here falls out of the strict scrutiny category 
since the cash dividend cannot be considered a "basic 
necessity." 
Third, Sosna and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 
(1973), indicate that where the durational requirement does 
not absolutely deny provision of a benefit or service but only 
delays it, strict scrutiny will not be applied. The court 
concluded that the Alaska scheme was fairly viewed as one 
which delays rather than denies. Although a new resident can 
never catch up to a current long-term resident in the lifetime 
of the oldtimer, he can catch up by outliving the oldtimer. 
And when he does catch up, the newcomer will be much better 
off than today's oldtimer was with the same number of 
dividends. Unlike today' s old timers who received nothing as 
they built up their years of residency, tomorrow's oldtimers 
will have collected an increasing number of dividend payments 
on the way to building their seniority. Moreover, as the 
Permanent Fund grows, dividends will be worth much more in the 
future. 
Finally, language in Maricopa County suggests that 
strict scrutiny will be applied when the durational residency 
8. 
requirement affects a "fundamental right" such as voting. 
Certainly if there is no fundamental right to file for 
divorce, there is no fundamental right to receive an equal 
distribution from the permanent 
residency. 
Concluding that strict 
fund immediately 




applicable standard in this case, the Alaska court turned to ~ 
examine the scheme under an intermediate standard of review, ~-~ >~ 
balancing the extent of the infringement on the right t~~ 
travel against the state's purposes and the "fairness and 
substantiality" of the relationship between those purposes and 
the classification used.3 The court considered that the 
infringement upon the right to travel here was so limited as 
to be de minimis. The scheme could be characterized as a 
penalty only "with great awkwardness": if anything, the new 
resident was rewarded for exercising his right to migrate by 
immediately getting on the bandwagon to greater future 
dividends. The state's interests, on the other hand, were 
3 The court applied this balancing approach to determine 
whether the dividend scheme violated the state equal protection 
clause. The court was unsure whether or not this Court in Sosna 
had adopted such an intermediate approach in the right to travel 
context. If so, the court reasoned that its balancing approach 
was the equivalent. If not, then having concluded that strict 
scrutiny was not applicable under the federal cases, the court 
reasoned that if the scheme survived intermediate review under 
the state constitution, a fortiori it would survive rational 
basis review under the federal approach. 
9. 
both legitimate and substantially furthered by the scheme. 
The statute itself asserts three purposes: (1) to 
distribute the state's new energy wealth equitably; (2) to 
encourage residents to stay in the state; (3) to encourage 
increased involvement by residents in the management of the 
Permanent Fund. As to the first purpose, the court found that 
it was legitimate for Alaska, particularly in light of its 
unusual history, to wisl) to reward its older residents for 
their many intangible contributions to the welfare of the 
State. So many had come to the State, exploited its resources 
and left, that it was natural for the State to feel a debt of 
gratitude to those who had stayed. This purpose might not be 
compelling, but it was at the least permissible. Length of 
stay was a rough but acceptable measure of contributions to 
the community. 
The second purpose, reduction of population 
turnover, was so clearly permissible and so clearly furthered 
by the distribution scheme that little needed to be said on 
this score. 
Finally, the court considered the third 
justification--that the durational residency scheme encourages 
involvement by residents in the management of the Permanent 
Fund. The court accepted the State's argument on appeal that 
the residency requirement was a necessary component of the 
Permanent Fund Act. Were distributions from the Fund made on 
a per capita basis, residents would realize that as more 
10. 
people came to the State, their individual share of the Fund's 
earnings would be diluted. The temptation would be great to 
mortgage the future of the Fund by placing its assets in 
risky, high yield investments so as to reap the highest 
possible immediate rewards before population growth. By 
assuring residents that each year they will get a bigger slice 
of the Fund, their fear that population growth will dilute the 
distribution from the Fund, and thus the political pressure to 
invest the Fund unwisely, can be neutralized. Similarly, were 
the distribution on a per capita basis, without regard to 
length of residency, the public would press for the most 
immediate and rapid development of the State's resources in 
order to increase the size of the Fund and the distribution. 
By contrast, the durational residency scheme creates an 
incentive for prudent development of resources by giving each 
resident an increasingly larger stake in the future 
development of natural resources. 
The court concluded that through the Permanent Fund 
and the durational residency distribution scheme the State had 
devised a 11 simple but unusual 11 way of limiting government 
growth and reducing population turnover while containing the 
push for immediate development of Alaska's resources. In light 
of the very slight, if any, burden placed by the scheme on the 
right to travel, and in view of these legitimate state 
interests, the scheme was constitutional. 
Writing in dissent, Justice Dimond noted that this ~ -
"' . 
was a durational residency 
Certainly such requirements 
requirement unlike any 




indicate bona fide residence as in Vlandis v. Kline, supra, or 
where in support of a legitimate state interest as in Sosna. 
But in all cases the requirement must be of reasonable length. 
By contrast, the requirement here is only limited by the 
length of the human life-span; the requirement creates 
distinctions between residents that remain for as long as they 
live. 
The dissent attacked both the majority's assessment 
of the individual interests at stake and the strength of the 
State's justifications. First, it was not correct to say that 
newcomers were really not treated any differently because they 
might outlive the oldtimers. The only way to test a 
durational residency requirement is to examine its effect on 
similarly situated people--viz, Two 50 year olds, each with a 
30 year life expectancy, one a newcomer, the other an 
oldtimer. The newcomer cannot catch up to an oldtimer with 
the same life expectancy, and the Court implicitly has 
rejected this "catching-up" rationale by its decisions in 
Shapiro and Memorial Hospital. Moreover, it was not fair to 
assume that newcomers would eventually reap their reward even 
if they could catch up. It is likely that the State's oil 
revenues will drop off sharply around 1990. Indeed, given 
expected population growth, it is likely that future 
government expenses will be so great that the dividend program 
) .... 
12. 
will have to be cancelled entirely. In short, it is only in 
the next few years that money will flow from the statehouse to 
the citizenry and those getting the biggest share by far will 
be today's oldtimers. 
Nor are the State's justifications convincing. If 
the State wishes to combat population turnover, there is no 
reason why it should give greater incentives to stay to long-
term residents. They are the ones who least need an incentive 
to stay in the State having already sunk their roots. Nor is 
there any reason why older residents should be given greater 
incentive than new residents to involve themselves in the 
management of the permanent fund. 4 Finally, Justice Dimond 
doubted that a "past contributions" rationale was a legitimate 
justification for rewarding oldtimers. The Court in Shapiro 
rejected a past tax contribution rationale in no uncertain 
terms: 
"Appellants' reasoning would logically permit the 
State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and 
libraries or deprive them of police and fire 
protection. Indeed it would permit the State to 
apportion all benefits and services according to the 
past tax contributions of its citizens. The Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment of 
state services." 394 U.S. at 632-33. 
Accord Vlandis v. Kline, supra, 412 u.s. at 450 n.6. 
4 Justice Dimond did not address the argument urged on ap~eal 
that the staggered distribution scheme was needed to prov1de an 
incentive to conservation and prudent management of the fund. 
13. 
In sum, an open-ended residency requirement that 
distinguishes between persons all of whom are without question 
bona fide residents could not be justified by precedent--
certainly not by Vlandis or Sosna-- or by the interests 
prof erred by the State. The State could impose a reasonable 
residency requirement, but once this requirement was satisfied 
all residents must be treated equally. 
Discussion 
In this section I first briefly review the Court's ----------p~st ~at~ent of durational residency reguirements. The 
Court's approach appears to vary depending on its assessment ~ 
of the nature of the classification and the relative strength ~~ 
of the individual and government interests affected or served ~ ~ 
by the classification. I then consider these three variables  
ct 4~·~14.. 
in the context of the Alaska scheme, adding my own observatons vf /Lbctc 
to those of the parties and the court below. Finally, I LA-4--~ 
hazard a guess as to how the balance should be struck here. 
A. The Right to Travel ( ~ ~) 
There have been six significant "right-to-travel" 
cases involving durational residency requirements; in three 
of these cases the Court has upheld the requirement, in three 
it has found the requirement unconstitutional. , , . ,, 
~~~
Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital  _ ~ ~-
The triumverate of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 ~~ 
~/;;...'' 
(1969), Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and Memorial ~





consistent approach to durational residency requirements. In 
these cases, the Court uses a three- step analysis on its way 
......, --............. 
to invalidating the residency requirement: 1) does the 
classification distinguish between new and old residents?; 2) 
is the benefit or right withheld from new residents of such 
importance that the right to travel is penalized?; 3) is the 
classification necessary to the achievement of some 
c~m~lling state interests? 
The Court begins its analysis by focussing on the 
nature of the classification. The Court first assures itself 
that it is dealing not with a classification that 
distinguishes between residents and nonresidents--for such a 
distinction would not invoke the right to travel--but rather 
with a classification that distinguishes between persons ~1 ~ ~ -
of whom are residents. The hallmark of durational residency ~ 
requirements is that they "divide residents into two classes, ·~·' 
old residents and new residents, and discriminate against the~ 
 
latter to the extent of totally denying them" the particular J.,.s.,_h_, ~
state benefit or right at issue. Dunn, supra at 334-35. 
Recognizing that not all durational residency 
schemes are unconstitutional, the Court then examines whether 
or not the particular scheme places such a burden on the right 
to travel that it must be justified as necessary to a 
"compelling" state interest. This step of the analysis is the 
heart of the matter and the most curious. On the one hand the 




infringe on the right to travel that directly impede travel or 
can be shown in actual fact to deter migraton. Thus, the 
Court insists that the right to travel is more than a right of 
locomotion, it is a right to settle in a new community without 
______... ._...,- - ~ -
penalty. In each of these cases the Court found that it made ~ 
/]..,t:;;l.L -
no difference that no one was actually deterred from migrating ~. 9f 
l4.. ~ rvtt t-1-
durational residency k~to the particular state by the -requirement--the right to travel had been infringed all the ( k ~ 
.a_~)' 
w;~+~' same. 
On the other hand, the Court is unwilling to hold 
that the right to travel requires that new residents be ~ treated the same as old residents in every respect. Or, one ?U-fw)~ 
might say, the Court does not consider classifications based ~~ 
on duration of residency to be suspect. Thus, the Court has (..e. f. ~ 
h 'd . h' h ~~) emphasized that only t ose res1 ency requirements w 1c · 
lA..A.-
"penaliz_e" the exercise of the right to travel infringe upon /. '--· /.. !-
~
the right. And by "penalize" the Court means that the 1-v ~ 
particular government benefit conditioned upon length of 
~r.t.L 
residence is "vi tal," "a basic necessity of life" or of ~/,.A. 
(.e. f 1-tJ ~) 
"fundamental importance." OV..~ ,~ .... 
The requirement of a penalty keeps the right to P-f ~ 
(~f.~ 
travel from invalidating all distinctions based upon duration ~) 
of residency. Yet by requiring the Court to ask whether a 
particular government benefit or service is "fundamental," the ~ .t1c.t 
penalty analysis forces the Court to pick and choose among 11~-a' 




Justice Harlan attacked when he dissented in Shapiro. Thus, 
although the Court may not have been acting as a "super-
legislature" when it recognized the right to travel as a 
fundamental right, everytime it must ask whether a particular / 
benefit affects a "vital" area of life it "pick[s] 011'( 
particular human activities, characterize[s] them as 
'fundamental,' and gives[s] them added protection." Shapiro, 
394 u.s. at 662 (Harlan, J, dissenting). See your discussion J J ~ 
in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 ~ 
- - ~~ 
(1972). 
Having determined that the scheme "penalizes" new g j-~ 
residents, the Court applies strict scrutiny to the state's f.o ~ &,_..., 
'~/.y" 
justifications, requiring both that the interests be  f- ' 
compelling 
fulfillment. 
necessary to their~~ 
In reviewing state interests the Court give'ft-~ · 
and the classification 
shortshrift to administrative reasons--particularly the 
prevention of fraud, the confirmation of bona fide residency, 
or budget predictibili ty. The Court gives no weight to the 
state's desire to protect its fisc: such a desire cannot be 
satisfied through an invidious classification. Nor is the } ~J­
Court sympathetic to the argument that long-term residents are ~ 
t~:eL>/1.. 
more deserving because of past tax contributions. The Court II~ ~ 
repeatedly rejects the "contributory" rationale. See Memorial 
Hospital, supra, 415 u.s. at 266. 
effect of finding that the scheme 
is to find the scheme invalid. 
-----------------
Obviously, the practical}~ 
"penalizes" new residents, ~ I 
Presumably, however, the 
converse is also true: if 
it need not 
a rational basis, 
suggested that a one year durational residency requirement 
before a student could qualify for lower in-state tuition at 
state universities was permissible. See Starns v. Malkerson, 
326 F. Supp. 234 {Minn. 1970), aff'd without opinion, 401 U.S. 
985 {1971) {one year tuition residency requirement upheld). 
See also Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 {D.N.H.), aff'd 
without opinion, 414 u.s. 802 {1973) {7 
requirement to run for Governor of permissible) . 
Vlandis can be seen to mark acceptance of a balancing approach 
to durational residency requirements. Surely what lies behind 
the Court's willingness to accept a durational requirement for 
lower tuition is the Court's sense that in this context the 
state needs a durational requirment to test the bona fides of 
claims of residence by "college students who come from out of 
State to attend that State's public university." Just as 
surely, however, this reason, howsoever legitimate, would not 
survive strict scrutiny. 
That the Court was prepared to approve of a different 
approach was made clearer in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 39 3 
{1975) and Jones v. Helms, u.s. {1981) . In Sosna the 





requirement for the use of its divorce jurisdiction without 
going through the 3-stage analysis used in the Shapiro line. 
Rather, the Court noted simply that the state's interests were 
not simply budgetary and administrative--as they were in 
Shapiro, Dunn, and Memorial Hospital--and that the individual 
was not absolutely denied the state benefit only asked to wait 
a year. 
Although the Sosna Court did not articulate its 
method, it may be stated as follows: If the state's interests 
are significant, .strict scrutiny will not be applied, but 
rather the state's interests and the need for the 
classification will be balanced against the individual 
interests affected. I think that this is a fair reading of the 
Court's method although it is striking that the Court would 
take such a sharply different tack in dealing with a right it 
has repeatedly described as "fundamental" without any effort 
to explain. Generally infringements of fundamental rights must 
be justified by compelling state interests under the glare of ----
strict scrutiny. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 
(1970 (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall ,JJ) • But I am 
unable to describe Sosna as anything but a balancing approach. 
One could say that the 1-year delay for divorce did not 
"penalize" the right to travel under the Shapiro standard. 
But if that is what the Court held, then there would have been 
no reason to examine the strength of the State's interests so 
closely. And if the waiting period did "penalize," then the 
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State's interests should have been strictly scrutinized under 
Shapiro. But the Court nowhere indicated that strict scrutiny 
was applied and I very much doubt that the State's interests--
strong as they were--arose to the level of compelling or that 
the delay period was the least restrictive means of achieving 
these interests. 
Certainly Justice Marshall in his dissent believed 
that the majority in Sosna had adopted a new balancing 
approach, and he warned that such an approach might dilute the 
strength of the right to travel. But I question whether 5o de J 
Justice Marshall was correct in his fear: one curious result 
of the balancing approach may be to give closer scrutiny to 
those durational schemes which--failing the strict Shapiro 
"penalty" test--would otherwise only be examined for a 
rational basis under the Shapiro line of cases. On the other 
hand, it may be that the Sosna Court only proceeded to balance 
after assuring itself that the durational residency 
requirement there "penalized" the right to travel in the 
Shapiro sense of affecting a vital area of life. If so, then 
Justice Marshall's point may be well taken, but the 
inarticulateness of the opinion in Sosna leaves this as a r 
significant open queston. 
Finally, in the Court's most recent right to travel ----case, Jones v. Helms, u.s. (1981) , the Court again -
appears to have ~dopted a balancing approach. In Helms the 
Court upheld a Georgia statute that makes it a misdemeanor to 
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abandon a child but makes it a felony to abandon the child and 
then leave the state. Helms is not a durational residency 
I 
case, and may have limited precedential value in this context, /~ 
even so the it is noteworthy that the Court appears to have - ----. 
~ 
used a balancing approach to the problem--the state's .,'AA..J- ,, 
interests were strong while the individual's right to travel ~;-
had been diluted by his criminal activity. In this way the ~~,. 
opinion appears to ratify the approach in Sosna, although the 
peculiar nature of the right to travel affected in Helms makes 
the case somewhat 
to ~~~J-4 
to travel with a right to flee a state's 
unique. The Court was not inclined 
equate the right 
jurisdiction. 
Probably the most significant aspect of Helms is 
that the Court treated the right to travel as a constitutional 
right independent of the equal protection clause. This is 
made clear in Justice White's concurrence. In so treating the 
right, the Court tacitly acknowledged the wisdom of Justice 
Harlan's dissent in Shapiro. Ironically, Justice Harlan 
urged the Court to treat the right to travel like any other 
due process right because he wished to remove infringements 
upon the right to travel from the strict scrutiny given to 
violations of equal protection. Now that strict scrutiny is 
also given to violations of "fundamental" constitutional 
rights, it scarcely matters under what heading the right to 
travel is placed. 
In sum, 
c:::::=:= 
there appear to be two lines of analysis, 
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the Shapiro line and the Sosna line. According to Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion in Sosna the choice of approach depends on 
whether the state's justifications are merely administrative 
or budgetary and on whether the state benefit or service is 
withheld entirely or merely delayed. Perhaps, too, as the 
majority opinion below suggests, if the benefit or service at 
issue is not one of the fundamental necessities of life, it 
may then be appropriate to examine the residency requirement 
under a balancing approach rather than simply under a rational 
basis level of scrutiny. One may argue further, as the Zobels 
do and as the dissent below suggests, that the choice of 
analysis will depend upon whether the state has a strong 
reason to doubt or insist upon the bona fides of a claim of 7 uiM. r 
residency as in Vlandis and Sosna. Where the bona fides of 
the claim of residency is not at issue, then the Shapiro line 
of analysis may be the correct one. 
Perhaps one should not make too much of the 
distinction between Sosna and Shapiro. Undoubtedly the same 
result may be reached under either analysis. Undoubtedly the 
~ [~u;!., ~ifst ~sess the relative ~~ of the c~peting 
vV'_1r1 in .. teres~ no_ matter ~ich app~_:ch i~ used. On the other 
~ v hand, I think that although the Zobels' argument fits poorly 
t I 
under the penalty analysis in Shapiro, their argument is of 
'-------------------------- l( a balancing considerably stronger force when viewed under 
"" approach. Because the opinion in Sosna provides no guidance 




1-o ~~ l/~~..,.~-·1 
... 
the most important aspects of the opinion in this case may be ~
to define that balancing approach, assuming that I am correct 
that such an approach exists. 
B. Nature of the Classification, Individual and 
State Interests 
Whichever mode of analysis is chosen--indeed as part 
. ([) 
of making the cho1ce between the approaches--the nature of the 
classification, th~ate and individual interest a~ted and 
served, have to be identified and assessed. - ------
nature of the classification 
Much of the difficulty in this case is engendered by 
the unusual form of the classification. As the Zobels are 72u.,_ J..i.-.et-
quick to point out this is a durational requirement of a much ~ ~ 
longer term than any other the Court has ever supported.
~~~ 
Here there is no waiting period after which all residents are 
treated equally, rather inequality is perpetual--a newcomer 
can never catch up to an oldtimer with the same life span. A 
perpetual caste of newcomers is created such that one may 
think of newcomers under the plan as a "discrete and insular" 
minority. 
The State argues in response that the scheme treats ,1u:t (...!-
~
newcomers no differently than anyone else. To the extent that 
 
the scheme treats persons unequally, the inequality is )'tu /.24-..· c 
.a--.~ 
pervasive cutting across the whole of the society. Virtually~
every resident, some 70% of the population, is treated  





more dividends: the hallmark of durational residency schemes-
-the division of the citizenry into two classes, old and new 
residents--simply does not exist here. Yet every resident, no 
matter how new, is in fact treated equally by the scheme in 
the sense that each has the same right to accumulate dividends 
and all residents of the same vintage are treated precisely 
alike. In short, the State denies that the scheme includes 
any durational residency requirement at all; new residents 
are immediately eligible for dividends and are immediately 
treated just like everyone else. 
Either of these two ways of looking at the 
classification is plausible. The Zobels argue that in any 
given year old residents get more from the fund than do new 
residents. In support of their view they point first to the 
legislative history. In speaking on behalf of the Permanent 
Fund Act certain legislators made derogatory comments about 
newcomers--" boomers and cheechakos," "Texans and Okies." It 
is no surprise that a majority of legislators are oldtimers. 
They argue second that the Court in Shapiro implicitly 
rejected the notion that new residents asked to wait a year 
for welfare were actually treated equally because they might 
ultimately stay for as many years in the State as older 
residents and thus accumulate as many years of welfare. They 
argue third that Mr. Zobel can never be treated equally with a 
man of his own age with greater seniority unless we assume 
that Mr. Zobel will outlive the oldtimer in which case we no 
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longer compare people who are similarly situated Finally, 
they argue that equal protection is something one is entitled 
to in the present; it is no solace to newcomers that if they 
stay in Alaska long enough and live long enough, they will 
acquire as many dividends as anyone else. Finally, the 
dissent adds a note reality: the idea that a new resident may 
catch up depends on the future prosperity of the State and the 
future existence of the Fund itself. 
In support of its view, the State argues first that ~ ~~ 
it is appropriate in this setting to take a long view and ~~ ~ 
up_~ 
consider that a newcomer may well accumulate in the course of ~ ~ 
a lifetime as many or more dividends than many oldtimer:.-~-~ 
Certainly when dealing with welfare or medical care it would 
be absurd to take such a view; these benefits are aimed at 
current need. But the Alaska scheme fulfills ~o current ~ 
'-..... 11-,-, ,_.. 
emergency need. Second, to demonstrate that the scheme really ~ - ~ 
does treat all equally, the State makes the beguiling argument~ 
that the plan is no different in effect than the per capita .II- ~1-s 
distribution the Zobels contend for. Consider that had a p~ 
~ 
capita distribution been made every year beginning in 1959, by 
1981 a long-term resident would have received 22 dividends. A 
newcomer to the state in 1981 has no cause for complaint that 
oldtimers have already received 22 dividends and that the only 
way he can catch up is by outstaying them by 22 years. Just 
as with the durational scheme, residents who have lived longer 
in the State during their lifetimes will have received more 
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dividends than someone who lives for a shorter time. If the 
per capita plan is permissible, so too should be the 
durational scheme. Finally, the State emphasizes that it is 
not only newcomers who receive fewer dividends than the oldest 
residents, it is the majority of the population. Indeed, 
native Alaskans, born and raised in the State, receive no 
dividends until their eighteenth birthdays and then are 
treated just like a newcomer. In short, the scheme does not 
isolate newcomers and there is no need for special judicial 
solicitude. If all the people who received fewer dividends 
than someone else disapproved of the scheme, they had more 
than sufficient political power to end it. ~.' 
I doubt that there is a single proper way of looking ~ ~~ 
h . h f. . h . . d ~ at t 1s sc erne. I 1 t were certa1n t at Just1ce D1mon was  TV 
correct in predicting an end to the Fund by 1990, then the~~ 
State's argument that newcomers are treated no differently 
from oldtimers would be untenable. If there are to be no 
dividends in the future, then old residents are getting the 
lion's share of the distribution from the Fund. But I doubt ;· 
that the Court can rely on Justice Dimond's gloomy prediction. ~ 
The State's argument that the scheme treats all residents 
equally is of course true in one sense, but the argument begs 
the question of whether the scheme violates the right to 
travel. If the present disparity between old and new residents 
is such that the right to travel is infringed then it makes no 
difference that ultimately a new resident may receive as many 
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benefits as an older resident. This "equality" is true of all 
durational residency requirements. The only difference here 
is that the new resident is immediately eligible for some 
portion of the state benefit. 
More convincing is the State's argument that even if 
there is inequality, the inequality is so pervasive that no 
judicial action is necessary to protect newcomers. To the 
extent that the "right to travel" rests on the notion that 
newcomers are a "discrete and insular" minority, and the 
Zobels emphasize this way of looking at the right, then the 
State's argument that the scheme affects the whole of the 
society has force. Yet the political argument is hard to 
evaluate. While 70% of the population receives less than the 
maximum number of dividends, a majority of the population has 
lived in the State for over 12 years. A resident of 15 years 
may believe that he is better off under the durational 
residency scheme than he would be under a per capita 
distribution. And there should be a tipping point under which 
a resident of a certain number of years is better off either 
under a per capita distribution or a seniority distribution. 
Perhaps the tipping point is at, for example, 5 years. Thus, 
it is probably not right that newer residents are within a 
political majority all of whom are disadvantaged by the 
scheme. On the other hand it is certainly true that new 
residents and residents of, for example, 2-5 years have much 
the same interest and that native Alaskans only accumulate 
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dividends after their eighteenth birthdays. The State is 
therefore correct in emphasizing that the scheme does not 
isolate only the newest of residents, but it rather overstates 
the case to claim that newcomers are a political majority. 
individual interests ----The Zobels argue that the cash dividend falls within ~~ 
the class of basic necessities identified by Justice Marshall J ~ 
in Memorial Hospital. The legislative history indicates tha~~ 
,~-_: · 
the dividend was designed to help Alaskans meet high wintk ~~ 
~ 
fuel bills and generally help offset the high cost of living ~ 
in Alaska. As the dividends grow with the Fund, they will ~ 
become an increasingly large percentage of a family's budget. 
'? 7Ju_. L~A- ~ ,, 
Moreover, the dividend results from sale ' of the State's ~--~ 
- t-j,.. 
natural resources. For the 
resident "owns" fewer of the 
resident would seem to work 
newcomer's property rights. 
State to declare that a new ~' 
~~~4-.c:.., 
State's resources than an older f ~. 
a serous deprivation of the ~ 
~i.-v 
For the state to share out its
natural resources on the basis of residency would seem to 
convey a message that new residents are less than full 
citizens. And if natural resources may be so conditioned, 
could other state benefits be similarly restricted--might the 
best state schools be limited to long-term residents? Such a 
possibility is more than hypothetical; the Alaska statute 
books are rife with measures favoring long-term residents. 
These measures fundamentally alter the equality of a 
newcomer's citizenship. Finally, the Zobels argue that it 
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cannot save the scheme that new residents receive some bit of 
the Fund. Could the welfare scheme in Shapiro have been saved 
had new residents been given, for example, one-half of what 
older residents received? 
In response the State argues that a cash dividend is 
in no way comparable to welfare, the franchise, or medical 
care. The amount of the dividend bears no relation to -individual need. Certainly some Alaskans will use the 
dividend for the necessities of life but others will use it on 
frills. Moreover, even if the Zobels are right that all 
residents "own" the State's resources, they have no property 
right to funds in the state treasury. Finally, just as the 
divorce in Sosna was merely delayed, here there has been no 
flat denial: new residents get increasingly larger shares 
from the very beginning of their residency. 
v/ State's interests 
The statute lists three purposes . The first 
....... 
interest is to provide for equitable distribution of the 
earnings from the Fund. Here the majority opinion below 
emphasized the rigors of the Alaskan experience and the 
State's natural desire to reward its faithful. The dissent 
noted that Shapiro had rejected a past tax contribution 
rationale for durational residency requirements and that the 
rationale was no stronger in the context of intangible 
contributions. The Zobels' repeat the dissent's argument 
adding that many new residents--pipeline workers--are the very 
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ones responsible for the State's oil wealth and the Permanent 
Fund. Interestingly, the State does not now seek to justify 
the statute on this equitable basis: this purpose is scarcely 
mentioned in the State's brief although the scheme is best 
designed to further it. Normally it would not be much help to 
a state to meet an 
requirement by arguing 
older residents. That 
attack on a durational residency 
that the State wishes to reward its 
is just what the right to travel 
prohibits in certain contexts. But perhaps the Court need not 
be blind to the special history of Alaska. Perhaps older 
Alaskans may be treated differently for the rigors they 
endured. 
Second, the State argues that the scheme gives 
everyone an incentive to stay in the State, thus reducing 
population turnover. The Zobels argue that to the extent the 
State seeks to discourage migration to the State the purpose 
is not permissible: to the extent the purpose is to hold on 
to its current residents, the purpose is not compelling and 
may be achieved by using the oil wealth to provide better 
public services etc. The dissent argued that a per capita 
distribution was equally effective at reducing population 
turnover: the State's scheme gives the greatest incentive to 
stay to those who are least likely to leave. 
Finally, the statute's third listed purpose is to 
encourage public involvement in the Fund. The State made an 
elaborate argument on appeal, and reasserts the argument in 
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its brief, that the durational residency requirement is 
necessary to conservation of resources and to prudent 
management of the Fund. Neither the dissent nor the Zobels 
directly address these arguments although they are central to 
the State's position. The Zobels dismiss these arguments 
summarily on the basis that (1} the Court in Shapiro rejected 
the argument that the need to create political support for 
particular programs could justify the use of impermissible 
classifications~ (2) were the State's purpose to create 
future incentives to conservation and prudent management there 
was no call to reward older residents retrospectively to 1959~ 
(3} there is no indication in the legislative history that 
prudent management or conservation were purposes of the 
scheme~ it is a post-hoc creation of the State Attorney-
General. 
The Zobel's arguments are of some force, but more 
convincing to me is how poorly the scheme would appear to 
fulfill the State's alleged purposes. The goal of prudent 
management of the Fund is achieved by assuring current 
residents that their shares will not be diluted by the influx 
of migrants to the State. Perhaps the Court should not second 
guess the State's psychological profile of its people. But I 
would think that to the extent residents are inclined to 
pressure the Fund's managers to place the Fund in high yield 
but risky investments, this pressure will continue unabated. 
Older resident may believe that with fewer years left to live, 
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they would like the greatest dividend possible immediately. 
Indeed, I think that it can be demonstrated mathematically 
that for these most senior residents the effect of population 
growth is actually magnified.5 one dividend more or less makes 
less difference to them than the size of each dividend, and 
the size of each dividend will vary with population growth--
unless of course the fund's managers can be persuaded to 
increase the yield. Newcomers who may be unsure whether or 
not they will remain in the State have the same incentive to 
the largest current dividend. 
The second part of the State's argument is that the 
dividend scheme dulls the pressure for immediate development 
of resources. Since individuals know that they will have more 
dividends in the future, they have an interest in future 
development and in present conservation. This purpose seems 
utterly irrlevant to the Permanent Fund scheme. Since money 
from exploitation of resources is placed in the Permanent 
Fund, and since the principle of the Fund is inviolate, why 
5 Imagine that there are 10 residents in Alaska. Resident #10 
has been in the State for 10 years, resident #9 for 9 years and 
so on. The income from the Fund to be distributed is $100. 
There are then a total of 55 dividends (10 plus 9 plus 8 etc) and 
each dividend is worth about $1.80. Resident #10 receives $18.00 
from the Fund. The following year a newcomer moves to the State. 
There are now 11 Alaskans, and 66 dividends. The Fund still 
generates $100 and a dividend is worth about $1.50. Mr. 10 of 




would anyone have an incentive to delay development? The 
State seems to have forgotten that income from development 
travels first into the Fund, where it is added to the 
principal, and only then to residents. ·- ~ .. i~~ 
C. Privileges and Immunities ---~ ~~~!!':;;:, 
,.~~~-#J~ 
It must be noted that in addition to relying upon~·~ • 
1/ 
the right to travel, the Zobels also argue that the Alaska ~ 
scheme violates the "federal component" of state citizenship. 
The Fourteenth Amendment states that all citizens of the 
United States are citizens of the state wherein they reside. 
Justice Bradley, dissenting in the Slaughter House Cases, 83 
U.S. 36, 112-113, stated tht "A citizen of the United States 
has a perfect constitutional right to go to and abide in any 
State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an 
equality of rights with every other citizen." As Shapiro and 
its line indicate, the state may test for bona fide residency 
through a reasonable residency requirement, it may not create 
different degrees of state citizenship. 
The State treats this argument as one based on the 
Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Examining the Court's recent treatment 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in~ldwin v. Montana 
Fish and Game Commission, 436 u .. s. 37 (1978) , the State 
argues that the Privileges and Immunities Clauses and the 
concept of a federal union are only implicated when the State 
seeks to restrict "basic and essential activities" to its own 
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residents. Id at 387. The dividend scheme does not involve 
such a basic activity. 
I think that this part of the argument can be 
included within the "personal interest" section of the right 
to travel analysis. The "right to travel" already includes a 
\,.,_ 
"fe~t": the federal interest in free migration. 
If a state scheme does create degrees of citizenship, this 
should weigh in the balance of harm to the individual and of 
burden on the right to travel. Moreover, as the State 
indicates, analysis under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clauses looks to the importance of the conditioned benefit or 
activity, and again the importance of the benefit is part of 
the analysis under the right to travel. Finally, the origins 
of the right to travel are at least in part in the privileges 
and immunities clauses, and it should make little difference 
under which constitutional right the durational residency 
requirement is examined. 
~ 
D. Conclusion: Striking the Balance 
The most striking characteristic of this case is 
weak both sides of the equation are. 
-:z::::: 
The scheme does 
divide the population into two groups, does not deprive new 
residents of the entire benefit and does not involve 
necessity of life. The provision of a unique cash gift to new ,, 
residents, even if the gift is less than that going to older ~~ .. 
residents, strains the penalty analysis. On the other hand, ~~ --- '  
the only genuine State interest appears to be to reward older
~ b~, 'Jn--~ ~fil-~ ~~ 
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. d ._.../" res1 ents. 
Even so I think that the personal interests at stake 
only appear weak when examined under the Shapiro line of 
analysis. Only with considerable effort can one equate this 
,.__ ' 
s~heme with one that requires new residents to wait for -----welfare or medical care. The Zobels argue that because the -
duration of the inequality is so long it should be deemed a -----
per se penalty whatever the importance of the benefit. Yet 
this very lengthiness of the inequality is also one of its 
saving features--"inequality" is pervasive throughout the 
resident population. 
The irony here is that if the scheme must be 
examined under Shapiro, the Zobels' case appears weak. But 
under a balancing approach as in Sosna the personal interests 
here seem more significant to me. The State Supreme Court ~ ~ 
h d 
. . ~-~-
el that the tax exempt1on statute could not surv1ve a
balancing approach under the state equal protection clause. ~ 
It found that the tax statute projected hostility to new tS~J?~~ 
residents and penalized new residents to the extent that their (~~.~ •~ 
~--- L-L,_...~ 
taxes were higher than they would have been were all residents .$/--~) 1 
~ r~S/C-1-
taxed. The Court further noted that tax schemes favoring 
residents had been disapproved by this Court in Austin v. New~~ 
Hampshire, 420 u.s. 656 (1975) and Travis v. Yale and Towner 
Mfg. Co., 252 u.s. 60 (1920). These were cases arising under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause in which nonresidents 
complained of discrimination. The Alaska court reasoned that 
35. 
-
if the state cannot tax nonresidents at a higher rate, i~ost ;r~ 
certainly cannot tax new residents at a higher rate, for the~ 
State has more leeway to make distinctions between residents ~ 
and nonresidents than between persons all of whom are 
residents. 
But the Permanent Fund Act is little different than 
a taxing statute that favors older residents. Indeed, were a 
State income tax ever renewed the dividend distribution would 
clearly have the effect of reducing older residents' taxes. 
Even without a state tax, the dividend operates as a negative 
income tax. And the distribution of money to a state's 
citizens, like the collection of money, would seem to involve 
a significant matter even though the sums involved are 
presently fairly small. Perhaps this interest is even 
stronger when the State is cashing out its natural resources. 
Most important, on the side of personal interests is .. -----
that if this scheme is permissible, one wonders what would not 
be. The Court in Shapiro attacked the contributory rationale 
on the basis that such a rationale would permit "schools, 
parks, and libraries" to be reserved to older residents. To 
permit this scheme, may be to permit just such distinctions in 
other areas. And were the country honeycombed with such 
schemes, I would think that the "right to travel," the right 
to settle in a new community, would be significantly altered. 
It is noteworthy that Alaska already has a number of such 
residency requirements on its statute books although many have 
~· : 
36. 
been invalidated by the state supreme court. 
One would not wish to go so far as to say that any 
distinction among residents on the basis of length of 
residency must fall. But that is the virtue of the balancing 
approach. It permits distinctions; it permits another case 
with stronger state interests--e.g. the need to identify bona 
fide residents--to survive. 
If the Court were to approach the case in this way, 
by weighing the interests and finding the State's interests to 
be weak, the Court would need to make clear that Sosna is a 
balancing case and that durational residency schemes in the 
future will be examined under a balancing test, even when 
"basic necessities" of life are not at issue. The Court might 
wish further to discuss the standard of review of the state's 
alleged interests or at least suggest the words. Perhaps it I 
would suffice to say that the state's interests must be ~ 
"substantial" and "substantially related to the scheme." 
Of course there are large questions any time the 
Court shifts to a balancing approach when dealing with a 
"fundamental" right. I think that the right to travel is 
particular enough--especially now that it has been removed 
from the equal protection rubric by Helms--that the Court need 
not be too concerned that anything it does in this area will 
carry grave weight in other areas of constitutional law where 
a balancing approach may not be desirable. I would think,too, 
that the Court would gladly leave off categorizing different 
37. 
areas of life as "vital" or "not vital." Your concurrence in 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 u.s. 374, 397 (1978) suggests a 
receptivity to balancing in an area such as this. Moreover, I 
think that the shift to a balancing approach has already 
occurred; the Court just did not wish to explain what it was ---doing. In short, the Court in Sosna appears to have diverged J 
from the two-tier approach in order to uphold a durational 
requirement. I suggest that we do the same here to invalidate ~~ S 
one. The St~e's intere~ts are either inconsequential or ~~r 
unrelated to the scheme; the personal intersts are ~ 
substantial enough that the statute ought, in my view, to be 
found a violation of the "right to travel." 
This could be the last of the great right to travel 
cases. Of course if the Court does uphold the law--and I 
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion 
Court. 
-~tJ- ,L() 
of the ~'"'~ 
The question presented on this appeal is whether a statute ~ 
under which a State distributes income derived from its natu- ~ ~ ~ 
ral resources to the adult citizens of the State in varying _:J....::..:_ I 
amounts based on the length of each citizen's residence vio-
lates the constitutional rights of newer state citizens. The ~ 
Alaska Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the () 
law. We noted probable jurisdiction and stayed the distribu-~~
tion of dividend funds,-- U. S. -- (1981). We reverse. ~  
I 
The 1967 discovery of large oil reserves on state-owned 
land in the Prudhoe Bay area of Alaska resulted in a windfall 
to the State. The dimensions of this fortuitous development 
are suggested in the comparison of the State's 1969 total bud-
get of $124 million with the $3.7 billion in petroleum revenues 
the State received during the 1981 fiscal year from its oil 
bounty. 1 This income will continue, and most likely grow, at 
'Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue Sources FY 1981-1983 
(1981). (Includes General Fund unrestricted petroleum revenues of $3.3 
billion and petroleum revenues directly deposited in the Permanent Fund 
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least for some years in the future. Recognizing that its min-
eral reserves, although large, are finite, and that the result-
ing income will not continue in perpetuity, the State took 
steps to assure that its current good fortune will bring long 
range benefits. To accomplish this Alaska, in 1976, adopted 
a constitutional amendment establishing the Permanent 
Fund into which the State must deposit at least 25% of its 
mineral income each year. Alaska Const. art. IX, § 15. The 
amendment prohibits the legislature from appropriating any 
of the principal of the fund but permits use of the fund's earn-
ings for general governmental purposes. 
In 1980, the Legislature enacted a dividend program to dis-
tribute annually a portion of the Fund's earnings directly to 
the State's adult residents. Under the plan, each citizen 18 
years of age or older receives one dividend unit for each year 
of residency subsequent to 1959, the first year of statehood. 
The statute fixed the value of each dividend unit at $50 for 
the 1979 fiscal year; a one-year resident thus would receive 
one unit, or $50, while a resident of Alaska since it became a 
State in 1959 would receive 21 units, or $1,050. The value of 
a dividend unit will vary each year depending on the income 
of the Permanent Fund and the amount of that income the 
State allocates for other purposes. For example, the State 
now estimates that the 1985 fiscal year dividend will be 
nearly four times as large as that for 1979. 
Appellants, residents of Alaska for three years, brought 
this suit challenging the dividend distribution plan as vio-
lative of their equal protection guarantees and their constitu-
tional right to migrate to Alaska, to establish residency there 
and thereafter to enjoy the full rights of Alaska citizenship. 
The Superior Court for Alaska's Third Judicial District 
from the General Fund to the Permanent Fund in the 1981 fiscal year.) 
The 1980 census reports that Alaska's adult population is 270,265; per cap-
ita 1981 oil revenues amount to $13,632 for each adult resident. Petroleum 
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agreed, holding that the plan violated the rights of interstate 
migration and equal protection. The court granted sum-
mary judgment in appellants' favor. 
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed and, by a 3-2 vote, 
upheld the statute. The court reasoned that durational resi-
dency requirements which do not penalize interstate migra-
tion might not call for the high level of scrutiny called for by 
this Court's precedents. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 
(1975); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 
250 (1974). The Alaska Supreme Court held that the divi-
dend distribution plan did not require strict scrutiny because 
it did not deprive citizens of any basic necessities of life or 
fundamental constitutional rights, as did the statutes held un-
constitutional in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), and Memorial 
Hospital v. Maricopa County, supra. 
In the view of the Alaska court, the statute did not rest 
merely on considerations of administrative convenience or ef-
ficiency, and only delayed, rather than absolutely denied, re-
ceipt of full benefits. Accordingly, the validity of the plan 
was to be judged by whether there was a rational basis for 
the distinction made between long-term residents and new-
comers. The court held that fixing the amount of dividend 
payment according to length of residency was rationally re-
lated to three state purposes: (a) rewarding Alaska citizens 
for their past tangible and intangible contributions to the 
State; (b) encouraging other persons to establish and main-
tain state residency; and (c) fostering citizen awareness and 
involvement in the prudent management of the Permanent 
Fund. The dissenting justices, viewed the plan as forbidden 
by the equal protection clauses of the United States and 
Alaska Constitutions. 2 
' The infusion of Permanent Fund earnings into state general revenues 
also led the Alaska legislature to enact a statute giving residents a one-
third exemption from state income taxes for each year of residence; this 
operated to exempt entirely anyone with three or more years of residency. 
80-114~0PINION 
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II 
The right to move from one State to another has long been 
accepted as fundamental to our constitutional system, yet 
both the nature and the source of that right has remained ill-
defined. In perhaps the earliest federal case to discuss the 
right to travel, Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting on cir-
cuit, noted that "[t]he right of a citizen of one state to pass 
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of 
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits or otherwise" was 
included among those fundamental rights protected by the 
Prilvileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, Arti-
cle IV, § 2, Clause 1. Garfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 
551-552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825). 
This Court first considered the right of interstate migra-
tion or travel in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868). Jus-
tice Miller, writing for the Court, held that the right to pass 
from one State to another free of hindrance or taxation was 
derived from the right and need of citizens to travel to the 
nation's capital and to the outlying offices of the federal gov-
ernment. Justice Clifford, with Chief Justice Chase concur-
ring, believed that the right to migrate or travel from one 
State to another had its source in the Commerce Clause. 6 
Wall., at 49. 
Justice Miller's adopted the reasoning of Chief Justice 
Taney dissenting in The Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 
(1849): 
Living as we do under a common government, charged 
with the great concerns of the whole Union, every citi-
The Alaska Supreme Court, again by a 3-2 vote, held that this statute vio-
lated the State Constitution's equal protection clause. Williams v. Zobel, 
619 P. 2d 422 (Alas. 1980). Chief Justice Rabinowitz, the only justice in 
the majority in both cases, found that the tax exemption statute, but not 
the dividend distribution plan, could "be perceived as a penalty imposed on 
a person who chooses to exercise his or her right to move into Alaska." 
619 P. 2d, at 458. 
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zen of the United States, from the most remote States or 
Territories, is entitled to free access, not only to the 
principal departments established at Washington, but 
also to its judicial tribunals and public offices in every 
State and Territory of the Union. . . . We are all citi-
zens of the United States; and, as members of the same 
community, must have the right to pass and repass 
through every part of it without interruption, as freely 
as in our own States. 
Thus prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the ri~Qf i!!_terstate~a~~nd travel was seen e · er as 
derivedirOril£lle Commerce Clause, from the Privileges and 
Im:rm:rnitles CTauseo!ArtiCiel:V or fromt he inherent right to 
travel to federal offices. In any event it is clearthat the 
riglit was recogrrlzed prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. ---
Nevertheless, more recent cases, faced with the difficulty 
of locating the source of this right, have looked to the Four-
teenth Amendment as well as other provisions. In Edwards 
v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941) , the Court held uncon-
stitutional a California statute prohibiting residents from 
bringing indigent nonresidents into the State. Although 
Justice Byrnes, for the Court, held that the provision vio-
lated the Commerce Clause, four concurring Justices thought 
the right to travel was grounded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Justice Douglas, concurring along with Justices Black 
and Murphy would have rested the holding on "[t]he right to 
move freely from State to State is an incident of national citi-
zenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference." 
314 U. S., at 177-178. Justice Jackson also would have re-
lied on the privileges and immunities clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The cases since Edwards have relied 
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See, e. g., Sosna v:lowa, supra, 419 U. S., at 418 
80-1146--0PINION 
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(MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
County, supra; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra. 
However, none of these specific constitutional provisions is 
entirely satisfactory as a source of the freedom of movement 
and travel. Reliance solely on various clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment ignores the cases decided prior to 1868 
and carries the untenable implication that the right to travel 
did not exist before the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted. Commerce Clause analysis is not wholly satisfac-
tory. As Justice Douglas noted in rejecting the Commerce 
Clause as a source of the rights found protected in Edwards 
v. California, supra, "the right of persons to move freely 
from State to State occupies a more protected position in our 
constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, 
steel and coal across state lines." 314 U. S., at 177. Justice 
Jackson, concurring in that case, persuasively argued that 
migration of persons without particular business purposes 
hardly fits into the usual notions of commerce. 314 U. S., at 
182. 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV pro-
tects citizens of one State only from discrimination in another 
State; it does not protect citizens already resident in a State 
from discrimination by that State. For example, a state law 
prohibiting citizens of the State from freely migrating to 
other States, or from leaving the State and then returning, or 
a law which taxes citizens who leave, as in Crandall v. Ne-
vada, supra, could hardly violate the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV but would certainly be a limitation of 
the right to travel. Nor is Justice Miller's rationale in 
Crandall v. Nevada-that the right to travel stems from the 
right to go to federal offices -satisfactory. Denying welfare 
benefits, medical care, or voting rights to new residents does 
not bear on the right to go to the nation's capital or to re-
gional federal offices, yet such denials have been held to vio-
late the right to travel. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
80-1146-0PINION 
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County, supra; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra; Shapiro v. 
Thompson, supra. 
The right of interstate migration or travel has both a more 
fundamental ana yet a less explicit SOl_!rce than any of those 
sources discussed above-.- ~ --
"The constitutional right to travel . . . occupies a posi-
tion fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. 
". . . Although the Articles of Confederation provided 
that 'the people of each state shall have free ingress and 
regress to and from any other State,' that right finds no 
explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has 
been suggested, is that a right so element.ary was con-
ceived from the beginning to be a necessary conco~tant 
of the stronger Union the Constitution created." 
United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745,757-745,758 
(1966). 
See also, Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U. S., at 
629-631. Whatever the reasons for the migration, the right 
to~el, like other rights, is so fundamental to and so inher-
e@_ in our constitutional system as not to require a specific 
definition. 3 
The right of interstate migration or travel encompasses a 
good deal more than the right of a tourist or traveller to move 
freely between States. It must be understood as compre-
hending the right to migrate from one State to another, to 
establish permanent residence and become a citizen of the 
3 We have often taken note that the Constitution does not mention the 
important guarantees of the right to vote, the presumption of innocence, 
the right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in 
a criminal trial, and the rights of association and privacy. See, e. g., Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 579-580 (1980). These 
rights , and the right of interstate migration and travel, are taken to be im-
plicit in the system establisahed by the Constitution and so basic as not to 
require specific mention. 
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new State. This fundamental concept has much in common 
with the right of new States to join the union on an equal 
footing with the older States. Here also the Constitution is 
silent, yet equality of each State of the Union, new or old-
has been accepted as inherent in the very idea of statehood in 
a federal union. Were this not so, Vermont, the Fourteenth 
State, and all subsequently admitted States would have had 
some kind of lesser status, perhaps like territories in relation 
The(e(i~al footing concep was first articulated, although 
to the originaLthii:t~s. 
not in 'tfiosewords, · yor of New Orleans v. United 
States, 10 Pet. 662, 737 (1836); there the Court held that 
"Louisiana was admitted into the Union, on the same footing 
as the original states." The words "equal footing" appear to 
have been first used in Pollard's Lessee v Hagan, 44 U. S. 
212, 223 (1845). The most recent reference to the equal foot-
ing doctrine is found in United States v. Texas 339 U. S. 707 
(1950) in which it was applied to deny Texas's claim that cer-
tain rights, which it previously possessed as an idependent 
republic, were retained when Texas was admitted to the 
Union. Texas was held to have entered the Union on an 
equal footing with all other states. 
We see, thus, that it is firmly settled, although nowhere 
mentioned in the Constitution, that a new State coming into 
the Union has no more, no less and no different rights than 
States of longer membership in the Union. Is it not simi-
larly inherent in the very concept of state or federal citizen-
ship that once citizenship is attained, the citizen stands on the 
same or equal footing with all other citizens? It is not with-
out significance that the concept of all citizens being on an 
equal footing with each other is by no means new. In deal-
ing with the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Court in 
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869), noted that 
"it was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question 
to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing 
8{}-1146--0PINION 
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with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages re-
sulting from citizenship in those States are concerned." 
We see, therefore, that more than a century ago, the Court (!ii~ 
used the e ual footing concept to define the equality of rights ~  ~ 
of citizens. As a ta e en ·ng the Union after the adoption - (/ ~ 
of the Constitution would have neither greater nor lesser 
rights than the first thrite~n States, an American citizen en-
tering a State and establishing bona fide residence therein 
can be accorded no less rights or lesser treatment than those 
who preceded. 
III 
Of course, as we have frequently held, a State may estab-
lish reasonable criteria for determining bona fide residence, 
and those criteria may vary accor mg to the nght or enefit 
sought. For example, a State may require a new resident to 
live in t!J,e State for a year before filing for divorce in state \ 
court.v Sosna v. Iowa, supra. A State may also establish 
reasonable durational criteria for pu:rposes of reduced resi-
dent tuition at a state university:v'Vlandis v. Kline, 412 
U. S. 441, 452 (1973). 4 But once those requirements are 
met and state citizenship is estaofiShed~ll citize~s are ~m an 
eqUal ooting. · · · 
n osna v. Iowa, supra, the Court balanced the interest of 
an individual in obtaining a divorce in her new State with the 
interests of the State in enforcing a one-year waiting period 
• A State may even set relatively long residency requirements when nec-
essary to serve particularly strong state interests. For example, a State 
may set a substantial durational residency requirement for candidates for 
public office, as does the federal Constitution. Such requirements serve 
the compelling state interest in assuring that high government officials are 
sufficiently aware of state problems and conditions. See Chimento v. 
Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D. N.H.) (three-judge district court), affirmed, 
414 U. S. 802 (1973). Alaska has not undertaken to establish similar resi-
dential durational criteria to qualify for full participation in the dividend 
program, however. 
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before new residents can file for divorce. Although acknowl-
edging that the Iowa rule might impinge somewhat on the 
right to travel, the Court found that the interests of a state 
"in minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to 
collateral attack" outweighed the individual's interest in ob-
taining a prompt Iowa divorce. The Court emphasized that 
the law merely delayed, rather than denied, the newcomer's 
ability to obtain a divorce in the State. 
Comparison of the interests of the State of Alaska and the 
interests of persons who have established Alaska residency 
since 1959 leads to a different conclusion, however. Con-
trary to the State's contentions, the dividend program does 
not involve merely a delay, rather than a denial, of benefits. 
Alaska's method of allocating benefits creates a permanent, 
irreversible distinction between those who lived in Alaska in 
1959 and those who came later. The cash dividend received 
by more recent residents will never be equal to that received 
by pre-statehood residents. Moreover, the law operates to 
classify and thereby divide Alaska citizens into an ever grow-
ing number of classes. At the time of enactment, the divi-
dend program created 21 separate classes of Alaskan citizen-
ship; 10 years from now there will be 31 classes; 11 years 
later the original number will have doubled to 42. Appel-
lants, residents of Alaska since 1978, will never receive the 
same amount as those who have lived there longer. 
Although the benefit here does not involve the ki~of basic 
necessity of life dealt with in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
County, supra, · for example, it does represent an important 
interest. Alaskans endure a relatively harsh climate and the 
highest cost of living in the nation. 5 A program which may 
6 See, e. g. , United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, Autumn 1980 Urban Family Budgets and Comparative Indexes for 
Selected Urban Areas (No. 81-195, April 22, 1981). According to this 
publication, the cost of living for a lower or intermediate budget family in 
Anchorage is higher by far than it is in any other metropolitan area. 
. . 
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distribute as much as $4,200 in fiscal year 1979 to a family of 
four eligible recipients, and perhaps four times that amount 
by the 1985 fiscal year, is hardly conferring insignificant 
benefits. Because of the significant financial interest of resi-
dents in receiving these benefits and the invidiousness of cre-
ating multiple and permanent classes of citizens with differ-
ent rights based solely upon when they exercised their 
constitutional right to migrate to and settle in Alaska, the 
State must show that the distinctions it seeks to make are 
warranted by the highest and most pressing of state 
interests. 
The State advanced and the Alaska Supreme Court ac-
cepted three state purposes to justify the dividend program. 
First, the program was said to create a financial incentive for 
individuals to establish and maintain residence in Alaska. 
Second, the dividend plan supposedly encourages prudent 
management of the Permanent Fund. The State contended, 
and the court held, that distribution of an equal amount to 
each resident would provide incentives for speculative man-
agement of the fund and unwise use of natural resources. 
The state's theory was that in later years, as population in-
creases, per capita benefits would decline, current residents 
would have an undue interest in speculative investments and 
in rapacious development of natural resources in order to 
maximize the fund's principal and therefore increase its in-
come. Finally, in the court's view, the dividend program le-
gitimately apportions benefits in recognition of the "contribu-
tions of various kinds, both tangible and intangible, which 
residents have made during their years of residency." 
The last of these objective-to reward citizens for past con-
tributions-is clearly impermissible. A similar argument 
was made and rejected in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 
U. S., at 632-633: 
"Appellants argue further that the challenged classifica-
tion may be sustained as an attemot to distinguish be-
12 
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tween new and old residents on the basis of the contribu-
tions they have made to the community through the 
payment of taxes. . . . Appellant's reasoning would 
permit the State to apportion all benefits and services 
according to the past tax [or intangible] contributions of 
its citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such"-· · 
an apportionment of state services." 
See also Vlandis v. Kline, supra, 412 U. S., at 449-450 and 
n. 6. 6 
The other two state objectives-assuring prudent manage-
ment of the plan and creating a financial incentive for individ-
uals to establish and maintain Alaska residence-do not jus-
tify the distinctions Alaska seeks to make. No valid 
explanation is offered to show how granting greater divi-
dends to persons for their residency during the 21 years prior 
to the enactment of the statute fosters these state interests. 
In any event, these state interests are simply not sufficiently 
compelling to outweigh the infringement of the fundamental 
individual rights of those bona fide citizens who settled in the 
State after 1959. 
IV 
Justice Miller, writing for the Court in Crandall v. Ne-
vada, observed that "it may be said that a tax of one dollar 
6 Even if the objective of rewarding past contributions were valid, it 
would be ironic to apply that rationale here. As Representative Randolph 
noted during debate in the state legislature on the dividend statute: 
"The pipeline is the entity that has allowed us all this latitude to do all the 
things we're considering doing, not only today but throughout the session. 
And without ... newcomers, we couldn't have built that pipeline .... 
Without their skill, without their money, the pipeline wouldn't be there. 
So I get a little bit tired of-and I've got a hunch and awful lot of people 
who have been here five or six or seven or ten years, whatever we knock 
off as newcomers, get a little bit tired of being chastized and penalized and 
discriminated against for having not been born here or not been here 30 or 
40 or 50 years." 
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for passing through the State of Nevada . .. cannot sensibly 
affect any function of government, or deprive a citizen of any 
valuable right. But if the State can tax a railroad passenger 
one dollar, it can tax him one thousand dollars." 6 Wall., at 
46. Similarly, if States could make the amount of a cash ben-
efit depend on length of residence, they could vary university 
tuition by years of residence or limit access to overcrowded 
public parks, or eligibility for student loans, civil service 
jobs, or government contracts by length of domicile. States 
could also do what Alaska attempted to do and impose taxes 
only on relative newcomers. Alaska's reasoning "would per-
mit the state to apportion all benefits and services according 
to the past tax contributions [or the intangible contributions 
that Alaska finds reflected in length of residency] of its citi-
zens." Such a result would be clearly unacceptable. 7 
We hold that the Alaska dividend distribution plan in-
fringes on the fundamental rights of those persons wh have 
estab ished bona fide Alaska res1 ency su se ue t o 1 59. 
The judgment of the Alaska Supreme ourt is reversed and 
the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
Reversed and Remanded. 
7 "Such a power in the States could produce nothing but discord and mu-
tual irritation, and they very clearly do not possess it." The Passenger 
Cases, supra, 7 How., at 492 (Chief Justice Taney, dissenting). 
C HAM BE R S Of'" 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL S TEV E NS 
October 14, 1981 
Re: 80-1146 - Zobel v. Williams 
Dear Byron: 
In connection with our discussion of the 
question whether the retroactive aspects of the 
Alaska distribution plan are severable from the 
prospective aspects, the answer may be provided by § 
4 of the statute which appears at page 69a of the 
Jurisdictional Statement, and reads as follows: 
"Sec. 4. If any provision enacted in sec. 2 
of this Act is held to be invalid by the final 
judgment, decision or order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction, then that provision is 
nonseverable, and all provisions enacted in sec. 
2 of this Act are invalid and of no force or 
effect." 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
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December 15, 1981 
Re: No. 80-1146 Zobel v. Alaska 
Dear Chief: 
I 
With the wide ranging discussion of sources of implicit 
and fundamental Constitutional rights which are nowhere 
mentioned in the Constitution which are contained in parts 
I and II of your proposed opinion in this case, you will 
soon have no one but yourself to . plame for this Court's 
docket-congestion. In due course I will attempt a dissent. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
.§u:vumt Qfourl nf tlr.t ~nib'~ ~htttll' 
'J)lra-s-Jri:ttgtcn, ~. Qf. 20.?JI.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
December 15, 1981 
Re: 80-1146 - Zobel v. United States 
Dear Chief: 
In my opinion the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides a more pertinent 
rationale for your conclusion than does the equal 
footing doctrine. Moreover, I am not at all sure that 
Alaska's program impairs the right to travel. It 
surely does not discourage travel into Alaska, even 
though it may have some tendency to deter emigration. 
In all events, I believe I shall try to write out my 
own analysis of the case. 
Respectfully, 
fL 
The Chief Justice 
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CHAM B E R S OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
v 
~u:pumt Qfourl of flrt 'Jlfutttb jtatt~ 
~rut~~. Qf. ZO,?Jl.~ 
December 15, 1981 
RE: No. 80-1146 Zobel v. Alaska 
Dear Chief: 
This is of course a novel, complex and difficult case. 
But my notes of the conference discussi~n~~icate votes to 
reverse based on the failure· to meet th?r~tionality stand-
ard of the Equal Protection Clause; although some of us also 
suggested that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment 
equated residence and citizenship and left no room for tiers 
of citizens. I don•t read your opinion as based on either 
ground and am sorry to say as presently written cannot join 
it. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
' . -
lfp/s s 12/15/81 ZOBEL! SALLY-POW 
80-1146 Zobel v. Williams 
Dear Chief: 
Your opinion is receiving a good deal of "flak", 
and I don't intend to add to it by a general circulation. 
The following observations are submitted in the hope that 
they may be helpful, as it appears likely some 
modifications in your opinion will be necessary. 
The difficulty is that this case is neither 
controlled by any prior precedent nor does it fit neatly 
into any prior analytical approach. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the reasons advanced at Conference varied 





There are six "right to travel" cases. Although 
this case is distinguishable from each of them, and in a 
sense is not a "right to travel" at all, our prior case do 
afford the closest analogies - particularly when viewed as 
a hybrid type of "durational residency" case. 
The first group of Shapiro, Dunn and Memorial 
Hospital ~nvolved a classifications that penalized a new 
resident by denying for a period a "fundamental right" (to 
vote) or a necessity of life (welfare, medical treatment). 
These were analyzed consistently in terms of inquiring 
under "strict scrutiny" whether there was a compelling 
state interest. 
The second group of cases, Vlandis, Sosna and 
Helms, were different in that no penalty was imposed upon 
the exercise of a fundamental right (e.g., university 
~ . 
3. 
attendance, divorce). Thus, commencing with Sosna, we 
have applied a "balancing" approach in which we weigh the 
competing interest of the state and individual. 
As I stated at Conference, it seems to me that 
the latter type of analysis is appropriate in this case. 
There is no absolute burden on any fundamental right. Nor 
is there any inhibiting of the right to travel into 
Alaska. Arguably, older citizens may be inhibited against 
leaving the state and thereby losing the higher dividend. 
But, I would not say - as your present draft does - that 
the right to equal "dividends" is so fundamental that the 
discrimination is "warranted [only] by the highest and 
most pressing of state intersts". P. Rather, I 
believe there is a better chance of putting a Court 
together if you rely on the Sosna line and apply a 
4. 
balancing test, recognizing that the state interests may 
well be important but that the classification does not 
subtantially serve~ its interests. 
The statute lists three purposes: ( i) to 
provide an equitable distribution of the earnings; (ii) to 
provide an incentive for everyone to remain in the state; 
and (iii) to encourage public interest in the fund. It is 
not at all clear that any of these interests or purposes 
is significantly furthered by the state's graduated 
dividend system. 
The individual's interest is pecuniary. The 
cost of living in Alaska is notoriously high. As the 
dividends grow with the fund, they may become an 
increasingly important to a family's budget. Putting it 




inverse income tax based on residency. Although this 
affects a significant personal interest, it does not 
compare with one's right to welfare or medical care when 
needed or to the right to vote. 
In weighing the competing interests, I view the 
case as quite close. On balance, however, I conclude that 
the rationality of Alaska's distribution scheme is dubious 
primarily because its relationship to the asserted state 
purposes seems so tenuous. In reality, the state simply 
elects to reward length of citizenship. No doubt this is 
politically popular, as the people who will benefit from 
this "windfall" are more numerous than those on the short 
end. But this is not a reason to sustain the 
classification. 
* * * 
6. 
It is evident, of course, that the foregoing is a 
rather simplistic outline of one way to write this 
opinion. I do think it is a sound approach and one that 
would not set a troublesome precedent. Also by omitting 
reference to "compelling state interest", "fundamental 
constitutional rights" and "equal footing", you may 
satisfy some of the complaining Brothers. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
•' . 
dfl 12/15/81 
To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: The Chief's draft in Zobel v. Williams: No. 80-1146 
I have one hesitation. Part III initially gives the 
impression that the Chief is going to undertake a balancing 
approach. He notes that in Sosna "the Court balanced the 
interest of an individual in obtaining a divorce in her new State 
with the interests of the State ... " At page 10 he begins his 
discussion of the individual and State interests at stake in this 
case: "Comparison of the interests of the State of Alaska and 
the interests of persons who have established Alaska residency 
since 1959 leads to a different conclusion, however." But he 
I L \\ 
then trots out the language of strict scrutiny. Having described 
the individual interests, he states at page 11: "the State must 
show that the distinctions it seeks to make are warranted by the 
highest and most pressing of state interest." And the discussion 
of the State's interests is conclusory, in the finest tradition 
of strict scrutiny opinions. At page 12 the Chief simply 
dismisses with a waive of his hand the State's major interests: 
"No valid explanation is offered to show how granting greater 
,. ' 







dividends to persons for their residency during the 21 years 
prior to the enactment of the statute fosters these state 
interests. In any event, these state interests are simply not ---sufficiently compelling to outweigh the infringement of the 
fu~ ~ghts of those bona fide citizens who 
settled in the State after 1959." 
In short, part III ends up being 
I ~r- ,l .. , 
· J~ suggestsAthat a balancing appr~ch will 
somewhat confusing. 
~ 
be followed. But then 
~ _f_a_l_l_~_b_a_c_'k- i _n_y_s_o_r_t_o_f_a_n_a_l_y_s_i~. I fear that 
this will leave the lower courts in considerable doubt as to the 
proper way to approach durational residency requirements. I 
gather from the Chief's clerk that the Chief wished to 
accommodate yo~ views in drafting this part of the opinion. -------
I don't think he quite succeeded. 
But 
Although I'm not sure that a compelling state interest 
approach is necessarily incorrect, and although I'm not sure that 
the Chief intends to adopt such an approach, on the whole I think 
it would have been safer to use a straight balancing approach. ~ ·~ 
Certainly, it would have been a better opinion had the Chief 
taken the time to analyze the State's interests with somewhat 
more care. More important I am a little worried that now all 
distinctions based on the length of residency or the fact of 
prior residency will be found unconstitutional. The opinion has 
some rather sweeping language in it about treating all citizens 
equally. The Chief does leave room for durational requirements 
for determining the bona fides of claims to residency. See page 
9 & n.4. But I am unclear whether or not a state law 
permitting persons who attended state law schools to be admitted 
to the Bar without passing an exam, or a law permitting persons 
who have apprenticed in the state for a certain number of years 
to be admitted to the Bar, would stand. Perhaps you can think of 
other such regulations that may now fall. I suppose various 
sorts of "grandfather" clauses might now be subject to doubt. 
Perhaps we could discuss this further after you have had a chance 
to read the opinion over. 
By the way, I think you might suggest that the Chief 
add the words "my children" to the passage appearing at page 8: 
"Is it not similarly inherent in the very concept of state or 
federal citizenship, my children, that once citizenship is ~~';f 
attained, the citizen stands on the same or equal footing with 
all other citizens?" 
•' 
December 15, 1981 
80-1146 Zobel v. Williams 
near Chief: 
Your opinion is receiving a good deal of "flak", 
and I don't intend to add to it by a general circulation. 
The following observations are submitted i.n the hope that 
they may be helpful, as it appears likely some modifications 
in your opinion will be necessary. 
The difficulty is that this case is neither 
controlled by any prior precedent nor does i. t fit neatly 
into any prior analytical approach. 'Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the reasons advanced at Conference varied 
considerably among the seven Justices who voted to reverse. 
There are six "right to travel" cases. Although 
this case is distinguishable fro~ each of them, and in a 
sense is not a "right to travel" at all, our prior cases do 
afford the closest analogies - particularly when viewed as a 
hybrid type of "durational residency" case. 
The first group of Shapiro, Dunn and Memorial 
Hoslital involved a classification that penalized a new 
res dent by denying for a period a "fundamental right" (to 
vote) or a necessity of life (welfare, medical treatment). 
These were analyzed consistently in terms of inquiring under 
"strict scrutiny" whether there was a compelling state 
interest. 
The second group of cases, Vlandis, Sosna and 
Helms, were different in that no penalty was imposed upon 
the exercise of a fundamental right (e.g., university 
attendance, divorce). Thus, ~ommencing with Sosna, we have 
--------~--~-~------~·" 





' .. , 
applied a "balancing" approach in which we weigh the 
competing interest of the state and tndividual. 
2. 
As I stated at Conference, it seems to me that the 
latter type of analysis is appropriate in this case. There 
is no absplute burden on any fundamental right. Nor is 
there any 1ntti6i£1ng of the right to travel into Alaska. 
Arguably, older citizens may be inhibited against leaving 
the state and thereby losing the higher dividend. But, I 
would not say - as your present draft does - that the right 
to equal "dividends" is so fundamental that the 
discrimination is "warranted ron1yl by the highest and most 
pressing of state interests". P. 11. Rather, I believe 
there is a better chance of putting a Court together if you 
rely on the Sosna line and apply a balancing test, 
recognizing that the state interests may well be important 
but that the classification does not subtantially serve its 
interests. __ _____..... 
The statute lists three purposes: (i) to provide 
an equitable distribution of the earnings: (ii) to provide 
an incentive for everyone to remain in the state: and (iii) 
to encourage public interest in the fund. It is not at all 
clear that any of these interests or purposes is 
significantly furthered by the state's graduated dividend 
system. 
The individual's interest is pecuniary. The cost 
of living in Alaska is notoriously high. As the dividends 
grow with the fund, they may become increasingly important 
to a family's budget. Putting it differentlv, the 
classification can be analogized to an inverse income tax 
based on residency. Although this affects a significant 
personal interest, it does not compare with one's right to 
welfare or medical care when needed or to the right to vote. 
In weighing the competinq interests, I view the 
case as quite close. On balance, however, I conclude that 
the rationality of Alaska's distribution scheme is dubious 
primarily because its relationship to the asserted state 
purposes seems so tenuous. In reality, the state simply 
elects to reward length of citizenship. No doubt this is 
politically popular, as the people who will benefit from 
this "windfall" are more numerous than those on the short 
end. But this is not a reason to sustain the 
classification. 







It is evident, of course, that the foregoing is a 
rather simplistic outline of one way to write this opinion. 
I do think it is a sound approach and one that would not set 
a troublesome precedent. Also by omitting reference to 
"compelling state interest", "fundamental constitutional 
rights" and "equal footing", you may satisfy some of the 
complaining Brothers. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
.. 
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Justice Powell ~ 
Justice Rehnquist 
Justice Stevens 
From : Justice O'Connor 
Circulated : ______________ _ 
~ 1st PRINTED DRAFT Recirculated : 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1146 
RONALD M. ZOBEL AND PATRICIA L. ZOBEL, AP-
PELLANTS v. THOMAS WILLIAMS, COMMISSIONER 
OF REVENUE, AND ALASKA 
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALASKA 
[December -, 1981] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. J 
As the majority observes, Justices of this Court have sug~ 
gested numerous textual sources for the constitutional right 
to travel or migrate interstate. 1 Finding none of these 
sources "entirely satisfactory," the majority eschews reliance 
upon any particular provision and concludes simply that the 
"right of interstate migration and travel ... [is] implicit in 
the system established by the Constitution and so basic as 
not to require specific mention." Ante, at 6, 7 n. 3. While I 
agree that the right to migrate is "basic," I am reluctant to 
stray so far from the Constitution's text to imply such a right. 
This Court should strive to rest constitutional doctrine on 
textual supports, not upon a nebulous conception of the Con-
stitution's "system." 
Alaska's scheme distinguishes between long-term resi-
dents and recent arrivals. It denies the non-Alaskan set-
1 THE CHIEF JUSTICE proposes a new entrant in this "right to travel" 
sweepstakes. He analogizes the right of a citizen to establish residence in 
a new State on the same terms enjoyed by other residents of that State to 
the "equal footing doctrine," under which this Court has accorded new 
States entering the Union the same rights afforded older States. See gen-
erally Note , The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doc-
trine, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 817, 833--835 (1980). Since the majority does not 
explore the ramifications of this analogy, I resist its adoption. 
DEC 161981 
80--1146-CONCUR 
2 ZOBEL v. WILLIAMS 
tling in the State the same "privileges" afforded longer-term 
residents. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, which guarantees "[t]he Citizens of each State ... all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States," 
addresses just this type of discrimination. 2 Accordingly, I 
would avoid the majority's reliance on a makeshift right to 
travel and evaluate Alaska's disbursement scheme under Ar-
ticle IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
I 
Our opinions teach that Article IV's Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause "was designed to insure to a citizen of State A 
who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citi-
zens of State B enjoy." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 
395 (1948). The Clause protects a nonresident who enters a 
State to work, Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518 (1978), to 
hunt commercial game, Toome! S?:tpra, or to procure medical r 
services, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973). 3 Similarly, 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause should protect the "cit-
'While the Clause refers to "Citizens," this Court has found that "the 
terms 'citizen' and 'resident' are 'essentially interchangeable' . . . for pur-
poses of analysis of most cases under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause." Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518, 524 n. 8 (1978) (quoting Austin 
v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656, 662 n. 8 (1975)). This opinion, there-
fore, will refer to "nonresidents" of Alaska, as well as to "noncitizens" of 
that State. 
It is settled that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not protect 
corporations. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869). The word "citi-
zens" suggests that the clause also excludes aliens. See, e. g., id., at 177 
(dictum); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-33, at 411 n. 18 
(1978). Any prohibition of discrimination aimed at aliens or corporations 
must derive from other constitutional provisions. 
3 See generally Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 (1871) (The clause 
"plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of one 
state to pass into any other state of the Union for the purpose of engaging 
in lawful commerce, trade or business, without molestation; to acquire per-
sonal property; [and] to take and hold real estate .... "). 
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izen of State A who ventures into State B" to settle there and 
establish a home. 
In this case, Alaska forces nonresidents settling in the 
State to accept a status inferior to that of old-timers. In 
1979, an Alaskan who had lived in the State since statehood 
would have received $1050 from the Permanent Fund's earn-
ings. A person who had migrated to Alaska during the pre-
vious year would have received only $50. In effect, there-
fore, the State told the non-Alaskan: You may establish 
residence in the State, but not upon the same terms enjoyed 
by those who are already resident. Surely this is one of the 
"disabilities of alienage" prohibited by Article IV's Privileges 
and Immunities Clause. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, { 
180 (1869). 
It could be argued that Alaska's scheme does not trigger 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it discrimi-
nates ~mong classes of residents, rather than between resi-
dents and nonresidents. This argument, however, misin-
terprets the force of Alaska's distribution system. Alaska's 
scheme treats nonresidents who choose to settle in the State 
differently from those who are already residents. The non-
resident contemplating migration to Alaska knows that he 
will never achieve rights equal to those who migrated before 
him. The fact that this discrimination unfolds after the non-
resident establishes Alaskan residency can not mask the fact 
that Alaska's scheme attaches a disability to status (or for-
mer status) as a nonresident. 4 
If the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies to Alaska's 
distribution system, then the Court need not rely upon the 
uncertain balancing test invoked by the majority. Our prior 
opinions describe a more definite standard of review. In 
'See Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Require-
ments under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1461, 1464-1465 n. 17 (1979) (labeling contrary argu-
ment "technical"). 
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Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, 436 U. S. 371 (1978), 
we held that States must treat residents and nonresidents 
"without unnecessary distinctions" when the nonresident 
seeks to "engage in an essential activity or exercise a basic 
right." Id., at 387. On the other hand, if the nonresident 
engages in conduct that is not "fundamental" because it does 
not "bea[r] upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity," J 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause affords no protection. 
Id., at 387, 383. 
Once the Court ascertains that discrimination burdens an 
"essential activity," it will test the constitutionality of the 
discrimination under a two-part test. First, there must be 
"something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar r 
source of the evil at which the statute is aimed." Hicklin v. 
Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518, 525-526 (1978) (quoting Toomer v. 1 
Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 398 (1948)). Second, the Court must 
find a "reasonable relationship between the danger repre- J 
sented by non-citizens, as a class, and the ... discrimination 
practiced upon them." ld., at 526 (quoting Toomer, supra, j 
at 399). 
Certainly the right infringed in this case is "fundamental." 
Alaska's statute burdens those nonresidents who choose to 
settle in the State. 5 It is difficult to imagine a right more 
essential to the Nation as a whole than the right to establish 
residence in a new State. Just as our federal system permits 
the States to experiment with different social and economic 
programs, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), it allows the individual 
to settle in the State offering those programs best tailored to 
5 The "burden" imposed on nonresidents is relative to the benefits en-
joyed by residents. It is immaterial, for purposes of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, that the nonresident may enjoy a benefit in the new 
State that he lacked completely in his former State. The Clause addresses 
only differences in treatment; it does not judge the quality of treatment a 
State affords citizens and noncitizens. 
80--1146---CONCUR 
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his or her tastes. 6 Alaska's encumbrance on the right of 
nonresidents to settle in that State, therefore, must satisfy 
the dual standard identified in Hicklin. 
Alaska has not shown that its new residents are the "pecu-
liar source" of any evil addressed by its disbursement 
scheme. The State does not argue that recent arrivals con-
stitute a particular source of its population turnover problem. 
Indeed, the State urges that it has a special interest in per-
suading young adults, who have grown to maturity in the 
State, to remain there. Brief for Appellees 35 n. 24. Nor is 
there any evidence that new residents, rather than old, will 
foolishly deplete the State's mineral and financial resources. 7 
Even if new residents were the peculiar source of these 
evils, Alaska has not chosen a cure that bears a "reasonable 
relationship" to the malady. As the dissenting judges below 
observed, Alaska's scheme gives the largest dividends to res-
idents who have lived longest in the State. The dividends 
• See also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935) (The 
Constitution "was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several 
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and 
salvation are in union and not division."); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 
(1869) ("Indeed, without some provision of the kind removing from the citi-
zens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving 
them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would J 
have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have con-
stituted the Union which now exists."); Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 
160, 173 (1941) (Constitution prohibits "attempts on the part of any single 
State to isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them by restraining 
the transportation of persons and property across its borders."). 
7 Alternatively, Alaska argues that its scheme compensates long-term 
residents for their prior tangible and intangible contributions to the State. 
Once again, however, nonresidents are hardly a peculiar source of the 
"evil" of partaking in current largesse without having made prior contribu-
tions. A multitude of native Alaskans--including children and paupers-
may have failed to contribute to the State in past years. Yet the State 
does not dock paupers for their prior failures to contribute. And it awards 
every person over the age of 18 dividends equal to the number of years that 
person has lived in the State. 
... ~ 
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awarded to new residents are too small to encourage them to 
stay in Alaska. And the size of these dividends gives new 
residents only a weak interest in prudent management of the 
State's resources. If, therefore, Alaska truly wishes to 
avoid population turnover and depletion of its natural re-
sources, it has chosen a singularly inappropriate means of 
accomplishing that end. 
For these reasons, I conclude that Alaska's disbursement 
scheme violates Article IV's Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. I thus reach the same destination as the majority, 
but along a course more surely charted by the Constitution. 
II 
The analysis outlined above applies to many cases in which 
a litigant asserts a right to travel or migrate interstate. 8 To 
historians, this would come as no surprise. Article IV's 
Privileges and Immunities Clause has enjoyed a long associa-
tion with the rights to travel and migrate interstate. 
The Clause derives from Article IV of the Articles of Con-
federation. The latter expressly recognized a right of "free 
ingress and regress to and from any other State" as one of 
the "privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several 
8 Any durational residency requirement, for example, treats nonres-
idents who have exercised their right to settle in a State differently from 
longer-term residents. This is not to say, however, that all such require-
ments would fail scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
The durational residency requirement upheld in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 
393 (1975) (one year to obtain divorce), for example, would have survived 
under the analysis outlined above. In Sosna the State showed that non-
residents were a peculiar source of the evil addressed by its durational resi-
dency requirement. Those persons could misrepresent their attachment 
to Iowa and obtain divorces that would be susceptible to collateral attack in 
other States. Iowa adopted a reasonable response to this problem by re-
quiring nonresidents to demonstrate their bona fide residency for one year 
before obtaining a divorce. I am confident that the analysis developed in 
Hicklin v. Orbeck, supra, will adequately identify other legitimate 
durational residency requirements . 
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States." 9 While the Framers of our Constitution omitted 
the reference to "free ingress and regress," they retained the 
general guaranty of "privileges and immunities." Charles 
Pinckney, who drafted the current version of Article IV, told 
the Convention that this Article was "formed exactly upon 
the principles of the 4th article of the present Confedera-
tion." 3M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 112 
(1934). Commentators, therefore, have assumed that the l 
Framers omitted the express guaranty merely because it was 
redundant, not because they wished to excise the right from 
the Constitution. 10 
• Even before adoption of the Articles, a few of the colonies explicitly 
protected freedom of movement. The Rhode Island Charter gave mem-
bers of that colony the right "to passe and repasse with freedome, into and 
through the rest of the English Collonies, upon their lawful and civil! occa-
sions." Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, p. 177 
(1956) (hereinafter Chafee). The Massachusetts Body of Liberties pro-
vided: "Every man of or within this Jurisdiction shall have free libertie, not 
with standing any Civil! power, to remove both himselfe and his familie at 
their pleasure out of the same, provided there be no legal! impediment to 
the contrarie." I d., at 178. Massachusetts showed some of the same lib- j 
erality to foreigners entering the colony: 
If any people of other Nations professing the true Christian Religion shall [ 
flee to us from the Tiranny or oppression of their persecutors, or from 
famyne, warres, or the like necessary and compulsarie cause, They shall be 
entertayned and succoured among us, according to that power and pru-
dence god shall give us. 
Ibid. These attitudes contrasted with the more restrictive views prevail-
ing in seventeenth century Europe. See generally id., at 163-171. 
10 See, e. g., Chafee, supra, at 185; Note, The Right to Travel and Ex-
clusionary Zoning, 26 Hastings L. J. 849, 85~59 (1975); Comment, The 
Right to Travel: In Search of a Constitutional Source, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 
117, 119--120 n. 14 (1975); Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to 
Travel, 22 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 1129, 1130 n. 7 (1975). 
See also Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656, 661 (1975) (Article IV of 
the Articles of Confederation was "carried over into the comity article of 
the Constitution in briefer form but with no change of substance or intent, 
unless it was to strengthen the force of the Clause in fashioning a single 
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Early opinions by the Justices of this Court also traced a 
right to travel or migrate to Article IV's Privileges and Im-
munities Clause. In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 
(No. 3,230) (CC E.D. Pa. 1823), for example, Justice Wash-
ington explained that the Clause protects the "right of a citi-
zen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other 
state." Similarly, in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 
(1869), the Court found that one of the "undoubt[ed]" effects / 
of the Clause was to give "the citizens of each State . . . the 
right of free ingress into other States, and egress from 
them .... " See also Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 
(1871). Finally, in United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, / 
297-298 (1920), the Court found that the Clause fused two 
distinct concepts: (1) "the right of citizens of the States to re-
side peacefully in, and to have free ingress into and egress 
from" their own States and (2) the right to exercise the same 
privileges in other States. 
History, therefore, supports assessment of Alaska's 
scheme, as well as other infringements of the right to travel, 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. As THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE points out, this Clause does not address every con-
ceivable type of discrimination that we might denominate a 
burden on interstate travel. Other constitutional guaran-
ties, however, may independently restrain discrimination 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not reach. 
The applicability of different constitutional provisions simply 
reflects the fact that the "right to travel" encompasses a vari-
ety of rights and a corresponding number of potential 
infringements. 
Uneasy with this diversity, the majority attempts to 
gather all possible manifestations of the right to travel under 
nation."); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 294 (1920) ("(T]he text 
of Article IV, § 2, of the Constitution, makes manifest that it was drawn 
with reference to the corresponding clause of the Articles of Confederation 
and was intended to perpetuate its limitations; and ... that view has been 
so conclusively settled as to leave no room for controversy."). 
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one rubric. The price of this uniformity, however, is the ju-
dicial creation of a right expressly rooted nowhere in the 
Constitution's text and vindicated through a standardless and 
ill-defined balancing test. I would avoid implying the broad 
right embraced by the majority. Since, however, Alaska's 
distribution system violates Article IV's Privileges and Im-
munities Clause by denying non-Alaskans the same residen-
tial status accorded long-term residents, I agree with the ma-
jority that the scheme cannot stand. 
CHAMBERS OF 
~ttpTtmt <!]curl of flrt ~ jtaft.il' 
~~ ~. <!J. 20~}1.~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
December 16, 
Re: 80-1146 - Zobel v. Williams 
Dear Chief, 
I shall await the dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
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CHAMBERS OF 
~nprtmt <!fourl of flrt 'Jifuittb ~tatt.s­
:.~~ ~. <!f. 20,?'1~ 
JUSTICE w ... . J . BRENNAN, JR . December 21, 1981 I 
RE: No. 80-1146 Zobel v. Commissioner of Revenue 
Dear Chief: 
I too shall await John•s writing. I do not think 
I could join any opinion that rested in any wise on the 
equal footing analogy. Nor could I join an opinion that 
rested on the Privilege and Immunities Clause. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.:§upumc <!Jcmi of ±Itt 2Jlttit.l'b ~m±tg 
~as!p:ttgtan, ~· <!f. 20~)1.~ 
' 
Decem~, 1981 
Re: No. 80-1146 - Zobel v. Commissioner of Revenue 
Dear Chief: 
I shall await John's writing. I could not join the 
Equa l Footing analysis in your present draft or that to be 
"maintained" in your next one, as suggested in the last 
paragraph of your memorandum of December 18. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
.iu.p:rtutt ClJourt ltf tqt ~h .ita:ttg 
,rulthtghtn. !9. Qf. 2llbi'L>~ 
C HAM BER S OF" 
T H E C HI E F J USTICE 
. ,f\; 
December 28, 1981 
RE: Zobel v. Williams, No. 80-1146. 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your personal memo of December 15. 
I expected some "flak" on this case because there are 
several rationales for a common result. I have some 
problems with most of those rationales: 
1. I do not see this case as really involving 
any literal"right to travel: The injured parties 
seeking relief are not travellers but established 
residents of Alaska. 
2. No fundamental rights are involved in 
case , in the Shapiro and Memorial Hospital sense. 
therefore hard to fit this case into the Equal 
Protection framework established by those cases. 
this 
It is 
3. I have long been skeptical of the balancing 
approach. It is too result oriented to suit me and it 
is a process more suited to legislatures than to the 
judiciary. 
I see this case as a matter of treating all bona fide 
residents equally without regard to the date on which they 
acquired the status of resident or citizen. It was my 
effort to meet the views of some that we should avoid the 
Equal Protection approach that has encountered resistance. 
Realistically, "Equal Footing " and Equal Protect ion are not 
all that far apart . 
As I re-examined the briefs over the past week, I was 
troubled by the dubious help we were given. This is a close 
and very important question deserving the level of advocacy 
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of an Erwin Griswold or Bernard Segal. I am considering 
moving for reargument and inviting competent amici to give 
us the kind of assistance this case deserves. 
Would you go along with a motion for reargument? 
Regards, 
dfl 12/28/81 
To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: Zobel--No. 80-1146 
I agree with you that it makes little sense to 
re-argue this case. It is a difficult case that does 
seem to fall between the cracks. But as we have discussed 
the right to travel cases can be seen to apply here. Sosna 
in particular provides an example. The Chief suggests 
that no "literal" right to travel is involved here. But no 
literal right to travel is involved in the right to travel 
cases either. The "right to travel" is itself something 
of a misnomer. Perhaps it is better understood as a right 
to settle in a new community on rough equality with the 
existing residents. So understood it seems to take care 
of this case rather well. 
It is hard to believe that new briefing 
would add much. The briefs are poor, but notshockingly so. 
I wonder if the Chief's real problem is that 
he should be in dissent? 
December 29, 1981 
q ~~ 
rf/fl ~ ~ 
PERSONAL 
80-1146 Zobel v. Williams 
Dear Chief: 
"_V. r/<} · 
~WI ~· .· 
This is in response to your letter of December 28. . ·/ 
I quite understand your sense of frustration. 
Neither the briefs nor oral argument provided much help, and 
the Justic~~ comments on your opinion afford inconclusive 
guidance. Nevertheless, I do not think it advisable to have 
this case reargued. we know that counsel of record cannot 
help us, and appointing distinguished amici might be 
difficult to justi f.y. My own view is that the case i.s so 
unique that further briefing is not likely to be helpful. 
It seems to me that your options are either to 
circulate a revised draft or reassign the case (either 
directly yourself or hand i.t to WJB). 
I have revtewed my Conference notes that I now 
summarize. You stated that the "Fourteenth Amendment 
controls". WJB cited Shapiro as the closest case, and said 
"Alaska's scheme inhibits travel" both in and out of the 
state. Byron voted tentatively to afflrm. Thurgood agreed 
with you, saying that citizens cannot be treated differently 
and that the Fourteenth Amendment controls. Harry said 
"Shapiro is the guide", and that this should be treated as a 
"duratlonal residence case". I would analyze the case 
primarily within the "right to travel" decisions, relying 
primarily on Sosna and Vlandis. WltR would affirm. John 
talked essentially in equal protection terms, emphasi.zing 
that the "state interest is nonexistent as to the statute's 
retroactive feature", and that even as to "prospective 
operation", the classification is discriminatory. Sandra 
would rely on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and does 
not think durational residence analysis is applicable. 
I·) J ; ~ ... 
--~-------- ~------------~------~~~ ---------------·-·-····---··· 
,-
2. 
Based on the foregoing, I believe you can put a 
Court together with an opinion written qenerally along the 
lines of my letter of December 15. The durational residency 
cases have applied egqal erotection anal¥~is to 
classifications that dlscrimfnated on the basis of length of 
residence within a state. None of our prior cases 
"controls", and- as stated in my letter- they differ as to 
the level of scrutiny. You could write this case on a sort 
of middle level scrutiny analysis - as in Sosna -
emphasizing - as John Stevens mentioned - that the asserted 
state interests simply do not justify the discrimination. 
Good luck! 
Sincerely, 
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T e question presented on this appeal is whether a statu-
ry scheme by which a State distributes income derived 
from its natural resources to the adult citizens of the State in 
varying amounts, based on the length of each citizen's resi-
dence, violates the equal protection rights of newer state citi-
zens. The Alaska Supreme Court sustained the constitu-
tionality of the statute. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P. 2d 448 
(Alaska 1980). We noted probable jurisdiction and stayed 
the distribution of dividend funds, -- U. S. -- (1981). 
We reverse. 
I 
The 1967 discovery of large oil reserves on state-owned 
land in the Prudhoe Bay area of Alaska resulted in a windfall 
to the State. The State, which had a total budget of $124 
million in 1969, before the oil revenues began to flow into the 
state coffers, received $3.7 billion in petroleum revenues dur-
ing the 1981 fiscal year. 1 This income will continue, and 
'Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue Sources FY 1981-1983 
(1981). (Includes General Fund unrestricted petroleum revenues of $3.3 
billion and petroleum revenues directly deposited in the Permanent Fund 
in the amount of $400 million. An additional $900 million was transferred 
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most likely grow for some years in the future. Recognizing 
that its mineral reserves, although large, are finite and that 
the resulting income will not continue in perpetuity, the 
State took steps to assure that its current good fortune will 
bring long range benefits. To accomplish this Alaska in 1976 
adopted a constitutional amendment establishing the Perma-
nent Fund into which the State must deposit at least 25% of 
its mineral income each year. Alaska Const., Art. IX, § 15. 
The amendment prohibits the legislature from appropriating 
any of the principal of the fund but permits use of the fund's 
earnings for general governmental purposes. 
In 1980, the legislature enacted a dividend program to dis-
tribute annually a portion of the Fund's earnings directly to 
the State's adult residents. Under the plan, each citizen 18 
years of age or older receives one dividend unit for each year 
of residency subsequent to 1959, the first year of statehood. 
The statute fixed the value of each dividend unit at $50 for 
the 1979 fiscal year; a one-year resident thus would receive 
one unit, or $50, while a resident of Alaska since it became a 
State in 1959 would receive 21 units, or $1,050. The value of 
a dividend unit will vary each year depending on the income 
of the Permanent Fund and the amount of that income the 
State allocates for other purposes. The State now estimates 
that the 1985 fiscal year dividend will be nearly four times as 
large as that for 1979. 
Appellants, residents of Alaska since 1978, brought this 
suit in 1980 challenging the dividend distribution plan as vio-
lative of their right to equal protection guarantees and their 
constitutional right to migrate to Alaska, to establish resi-
dency there and thereafter to enjoy the full rights of Alaska 
from the General Fund to the Permanent Fund in the 1981 fiscal year.) 
The 1980 census reports that Alaska's adult population is 270,265; per cap-
ita 1981 oil revenues amount to $13,632 for each adult resident. Petroleum 
revenues now amount to 89% of the State's total government revenue. 
Ibid. 
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citizenship on the same terms as all other citizens of the 
State. The Superior Court for Alaska's Third Judicial Dis-
trict granted summary judgment in appellants' favor, holding 
that the plan violated the rights of interstate travel and equal 
protection. A divided Alaska Supreme Court reversed and 
upheld the statute. 2 
II 
The Alaska dividend distribution law is quite unlike the 
durational residency requirements we examined in Sosna v. 
Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 
330 (1972); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). 
Those cases involved laws which required new residents to 
reside in the State a fixed minimum period to be eligible for 
certain benefits available to other residents. 3 The asserted 
purpose of the durational residency requirements was to as-
sure that only bona fide state residents received rights and 
benefits provided for residents. 
The Alaska statute does not impose any threshold waiting 
period on those seeking dividend benefits; even persons with 
2 The infusion of Permanent Fund earnings into state general revenues 
also led the Alaska legislature to enact a statute giving residents a one-
third exemption from state income taxes for each year of residence; this 
operated to exempt entirely anyone with three or more years of residency. 
The Alaska Supreme Court, again by a 3-2 vote, held that this statute vio-
lated the State Constitution's equal protection clause. Williams v. Zobel, 
619 P. 2d 422 (Alas. 1980). Chief Justice Rabinowitz, the only justice in 
the majority in both cases, found that the tax exemption statute, but not 
the dividend distribution plan, could "be perceived as a penalty imposed on 
a person who chooses to exercise his or her right to move into Alaska." 
619 P. 2d, at 458. 
3 In the durational residencey cases, we examined state laws which im-
posed waiting periods on access to divorce courts, Sosna v. Iowa, supra; 
eligibility for free nonemergency medical care, Memorial Hospital v. 
Maricopa County, supra; voting rights, Dunn v. Blumstein, supra; and 
welfare assistance, Shapiro v. Thompson, supra. 
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less than a full year of residency are entitled to share in the 
distribution. Alaska Stat. § 43.23.010(±).4 The law also 
does not purport to establish a test of the bona fides of state 
residence. Instead, the dividend statute creates fixed, per-
manent distinctions between an ever increasing number of 
perpetual classes of concededly bona fide residents based on 
when they moved into the State. 
Appellants established residence in Alaska two years be-
fore the dividend law was passed. The distinction they com-
plain of is not one which the State makes between those who 
arrived in Alaska after the enactment of the dividend distri-
bution law and those who were residents prior to that enact-
ment. Appellants instead challenge the · distinctions made 
within the class of persons who were residents when the divi-
dend scheme was enacted in 1980. The distinctions appel-
lants attack include the preference given to persons who 
were residents when Alaska became a State in 1959 over all 
those who have arrived since then, as well as the distinctions 
made between all bona fide residents who settled in Alaska at 
different times during the 1959 to 1980 period. 
When a State distributes benefits unequally, the distinc-
tions it makes are subject to scrutiny under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Generally, 
' Section 43.23.010(b) provides: 
"For each year, an individual is eligible to receive payment of the perma-
nent fund dividends for which he is entitled under this section if he 
(1) is at least 18 years of age; and 
(2) is a state resident during all or part of the year for which the perma-
nent fund dividend is paid. 
The remainder of§ 43.23.010 establishes the number of dividend units resi-
dents are entitled to receive and the method of payment. Section 
43.23.010(f) provides that a resident entitled to benefits under subsection 
(b) who was a resident for less than a full year is entitled to a dividend pro-
rated on the basis of the number of months of state residence. 
; The Alaska courts considered whether the dividend distribution law vi-
olated appellants' constitutional right to travel. The right to travel and to 
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a law will survive that scrutiny if the distinction it makes ra-
tionally furthers a legitimate state purpose. Some particu-
larly invidious distinctions are subject to more rigorous scru-
tiny. Appellants claim that the distinctions made by the 
Alaska law should be subjected to the higher level of scrutiny 
applied to the durational residency requirements in Shapiro 
v. Thompson, supra and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
County, supra. The State, on the other hand, asserts that 
the law need only meet the minimum rationality test. In any 
event, if the statutory scheme cannot pass even the minimal 
test proposed by the State, we need not decide whether any 
enhanced scrutiny is called for. 
A 
The State advanced and the Alaska Supreme Court ac-
cepted three purposes justifying the distinctions made by the 
dividend program: creation of a financial incentive for individ-
uals to establish and maintain residence in Alaska; encour-
agement of prudent management of the Permanent Fund; 
and apportionment of benefits in recognition of undefined 
move from one state to another has long been accepted, yet both the nature 
and the source of that right has remained obscure. See Jones v. Helms, 
-- U. S. --, -----and nn. 12 and 13 (1981), Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, supra, 394 U. S. at 629-631; United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 
757-759 (1966). See also Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitu-
tion 18&-193 (1956). In addition to protecting persons against the erection 
of actual barriers to interstate movement, the right to travel, when applied 
to residency requirements, protects new residents of a state from being 
disadvantaged because of their recent migration or from otherwise being 
treated differently from longer-term residents. In reality, right to travel 
analysis refers to little more than a particular application of equal protec-
tion analysis. Right to travel cases have examined, in equal protection 
terms, state distinctions between newcomers and longer-term residents. 
See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, supra; Dunn v. Blumstein, 
supra; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra. This case also involves distinctions 
between residents based on when they arrived in the State and is therefore 
also subject to equal protection analysis. 
\ 
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"contributions of various kinds, both tangible and intangible, 
which residents have made during their years of residency," 
619 P. 2d, at 458. 6 
As the Alaska Supreme Court apparently realized, the first 
two state objectives-creating a financial incentive for indi-
viduals to establish and maintain Alaska residence and assur-
ing prudent management of the Permanent Fund and the 
State's natural and mineral resources-are not rationally re-
lated to the distinctions Alaska seeks to make between newer 
residents and those who have been in the State since 1959. 7 
Assuming arguendo that granting increased dividend bene-
fits for each year of continued Alaska residence might give 
some residents an incentive to stay in the state in order to 
reap increased dividend benefits in the future, the State's in-
terest is not in any way served by granting greater dividend's-
to persons for their residency during the 21 years prior to the \ \ 
enactment. 8 \ 
6 These purposes were enumerated in the first section of the act creating 
the dividend distribution plan, 21 Alaska Sess. Laws § 1(b): 
\ 
"(b) The purposes of this Act are 
(1) to provide a mechanism for equitable distribution to the people of 
Alaska of at least a portion of the state's energy wealth derived from the 
development and production of the natural resources belonging to them as 
Alaskans; 
(2) to encourage persons to maintain their residence in Alaska and to re-
duce population turnover in the state; and 
(3) to encourage increased awareness and involvement by the residents 
of the state in the management and expenditure of the Alaska permanent 
fund (art. IX, sec. 15, state constitution)." 
Thus we need not speculate as to the objectives of the legislature. 
7 In response to the argument that the objectives of stabilizing popula-
tion and encouraging prudent management of the Permanent Fund and the 
State's natural resources did not justify the application of the dividend pro-
gram to the years 1959 to 1980, the Alaska Supreme Court maintained that 
the retrospective aspect of the program was justified by the objective of 
rewarding state citizens for past contributions. 619 P. 2d, at 461-462 n. 
37. See also dissenting opinion of Justice Dimond, 619 P. 2d, 469-471. 
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Nor does the State purpose of furthering the prudent man-
agement of the Permanent Fund and the state's resources 
support retrospective application of its plan to the date 
of statehood. On this score the state's contention is 
straightforward: 
"[A]s population increases, each individual share in the 
income stream is diluted. The income must be divided 
equally among increasingly large numbers of people. If 
residents believed that twenty years from now they 
would be required to share permanent fund income on a 
per capita basis with the large population that Alaska 
will no doubt have by then, the temptation would be 
great to urge the legislature to provide immediately for 
the highest possible return'- on the investments of the 
permanent fund principal, which would require invest-
ments in riskier ventures." 
Williams v. Zobel, supra, 619 P. 2d, at'462. The State simi-
larly argues that equal per capita distribution would encour-
age rapacious development of natural resources. Ibid. 
Even if we assume that the state interest is served by in-
creasing the dividend for each year of residency beginning 
with the date of enactment, is it rationally served by granting 
greater dividends in varying amounts to those who resided in 
Alaska during the 21 years prior to enactment? We think 
not. , 
The last of the State's objective-to/ reward citizens for 
leave the State than well-established residents; it would thus seem that the 
State would give a larger, rather than a smaller, dividend to new residents 
if it wanted to discourage emigration. The seeming attitude of disdain for 
newcomers created by the dividend law seems a most unlikely way to con-
vince new Alaskans that the State welcomes them and wants them to stay. 
Of course, the State's objective of reducing population turnover cannot 
be interpreted as an attempt to inhibit migration into the State without en-
countering insurmountable constitutional difficulties. See Shapiro v. 
Thompson, supra, 394 U. S., at 629. 
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past contributions-alone was relied upon by the Alaska Su-
preme Court to support the retrospective application of the 
law to 1959. However, that objective is clearly not a legiti-
mate state purpose. A similar "past contributions" argu-
ment was made and rejected in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 
394 U. S., at 632-633: 
"Appellants argue further that the challenged classifica-
tion may be sustained as an attempt to distinguish be-
tween new and old residents on the basis of the contribu-
tions they have made to the community through the pay-
ment of taxes. . . . Appellant's reasoning would permit 
the State to apportion all benefits and services according 
to the past tax [or intangible] contributions of its citi-
zens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an 
apportionment of state services." 
\ 
Similarly, ihylandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), we noted 
that "apportfon[ment] of tuition rates on the basis of old and 
new residency ... would give rise to grave problems under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
412 U. S., at 449-450 and n. 6. 9 
If the States can make the amount of a cash dividend de-
pend on length of residence, what would preclude varying 
university tuition on a sliding scale based on years of resi-
dence-or even 1limiting access to finite public facilities, eligi-
9 Even if the o»jective of rewarding past contributions were valid, it 
would be ironic t6 apply that rationale here. As Representative Randolph 
noted during debate in the state legislature on the dividend statute: 
"The pipeline is 'the entity that has allowed us all this latitude to do all the 
things we're considering doing, not only today but throughout the session. 
And without ... newcomers, we couldn't have built that pipeline .... 
Without their skill, without their money, the pipeline wouldn't be there. 
So I get a little bit tired of-and I've got a hunch and awful lot of people 
who have been here five or six or seven or ten years, whatever we knock 
off as newcomers, get a little bit tired of being chastized and penalized and 
discriminated against for having not been born here or not been here 30 or 
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bility for student loans, for civil service jobs, or for govern-
ment contracts by length of domicile? Could States impose 
different taxes based on length of residence? Alaska's rea- \ ~_} 
c. soning would open the door to state apportionment of ~ 
rights, benefits and services according to length of rest-
dency.10 It would permit the states to divide citizens into ex-
panding numbers of permanent classes. 11 Such a result 
would be clearly impermissible. 12 
B 
We need not consider whether the state could enact the 
dividend program prospectively only. Invalidation of a por-
tion of a statute does not necessarily render the whole invalid 
unless it is evident that the legislature would not have en-
acted the legislation without the invalid portion. Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108 (1976); United States v. Jackson, 390 
U. S. 570, 585 (1968); Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Commission, 
286 U. S. 210,234 (1932). Here, we need not speculate as to 
the intent of the Alaska legislature; the legislation expressly 
\ provides that invalidation of any portion of the statute ren-
I 
10 An exception might be found for "fundamental rights" and services 
deemed to involve "basic necessities of life." See Memorial Hospital v. 
Maricopa County, supra, 415 U. S., at 259. 
" "Such a power in the States could produce nothing but discord and mu-
tual irritation, and they very clearly do not possess it." The Passenger 
Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849) (Chief Justice Taney, dissenting). 
12 Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn 1970), affirmed, 410 
U. S. 985 (1971) cannot be read as a contrary decision of this Court. First 
of all, summary affirmance by this Court cannot be read as an adoption of 
the reasoning of the court below. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 391 
(1975) (concurring opinion). See also Colorado Springs Amusement Ltd. 
v. Rizzo, 428 U. S. 913, 920--921 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974). Moreover, as we pointed 
out in Vlandis v. Kline, supra, at 452-453, n. 9, we considered the Minne-
sota one-year residency requirement examined in Starns a test of bonafide 
residence, not a return on prior contributions. 
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ders the whole invalid: 
"Sec. 4. If any provision enacted in sec. 2 of this Act 
[which included the dividend distribution plan in its en-
tirety] is held to be invalid by the final judgment, deci-
sion or order of a court of competent jurisdiction, then 
that provision is nonseverable, and all provisions enacted 
in sec. 2 of this Act are invalid and of no force or effect." 
1980 Alaska Sess. Laws Chap. 21, § 4. It will of course be 
for the Alaska courts to pass on the severability clause of the 
statute. 
III 
The only apparent justification for the retrospective aspect 
of the program, "favoring established residents over new res-
idents," is constitutionally unacceptable. Vlandis v. Kline, 
supra, 412 U. S., at 450. In our view Alaska has shown no 
valid state interests which are rationally served by the dis-
tinction it makes between citizens who established residence 
before 1959 and those who have become residents since then. 
We hold that the Alaska dividend distribution plan violates 
the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
Alaska Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and Remanded. 
~u:punu C!f.omt ltf.llrt> ~i:uh ~hrlt.S' 
~IUl'J.ri:ngUnt. ~. C!f. 2!Jgt'1~ 
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Re: 80-1146 - Zobel v. Williams 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. 
The Court strikes Alaska's distribution scheme, purporting 
to rely solely upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The phrase "right to travel" appears 
only fleetingly in the Court's analysis, dismissed with an ob-
servation that "right to travel analysis refers to little more 
than a particular application of equal protection analysis." 
Ante, at 5 n. 5. The Court's reluctance to rely explicitly on 
the right to travel is odd, because its c epen s on the 
assumption that Alaska's desire to reward past contributions 
of its citizens is not a legitimate state purpose. Nothing in 
the Equal Protection Clause itself, however, declares this ob-
jective illegitimate. Instead, as a full reading of Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), reveals, Alaska's purpose is 
illegitimate only because it abridges a constitutionally pro-
tected right to travel. !d., at 629-631, 634, 638. I prefer to '" 
confront more directly both the constitutional defects in Alas-
ka's scheme and the constitutional roots of this enigmatic 
right to travel. 
Alaska's distribution plan distinguishes between long-term 
residents and recent arrivals. Stripped to its essentials, the 
plan denies non-Alaskans settling in the State the same privi-
leges afforded longer-term residents. The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, which guarantees "[t]he 
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Citizens of each State ... all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States," addresses just this type of 
discrimination. 1 Accordingly, I would measure Alaska's 
scheme against the principles implementing the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause. In addition to resolving the particu-
lar problems raised by Alaska's scheme, this analysis supplies 
a needed foundation for many of the "right to travel" claims 
recognized by the Court. 
I 
Our opinions teach that Article IV's Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause "was designed to insure to a citizen of State A 
who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citi-
zens of State B enjoy." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 
395 (1948). The Clause protects a nonresident who enters a 
State to work, Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518 (1978), to 
hunt commercial game, Toomer supra, or to procure medical 
services, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973). 2 Similarly, 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause should protect the "cit-
'While the Clause refers to "Citizens," this Court has found that "the 
terms 'citizen' and 'resident' are 'essentially interchangeable' ... for pur-
poses of analysis of most cases under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause." Hicklin v. Or-beck, 437 U. S. 518, 524 n. 8 (1978) (quoting Austin 
v. New Hampshir-e, 420 U. S. 656, 662 n. 8 (1975)). This opinion, there-
fore, will refer to "nonresidents" of Alaska, as well as to "noncitizens" of 
that State. 
It is settled that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not protect I 
corporations. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869). The word "Citi-
zens" suggests that the Clause also excludes aliens. See, e. g., id., at 177 
(dictum); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-33, at 411 n. 18 
(1978). Any prohibition of discrimination aimed at aliens or corporations 
must derive from other constitutional provisions. 
~ See generally Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 (1871) (The Clause l 
"plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of one 
state to pass into any other state of the Union for the purpose of engaging 
in lawful commerce, trade or business, without molestation; to acquire per-
sonal property; [and] to take and hold real estate ... . "). 
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izen of State A who ventures into State B" to settle there and 
establish a home. 
In this case, Alaska forces nonresidents settling in the 
State to accept a status inferior to that of old-timers. In 
1979, an Alaskan who had lived in the State since state~ood 
would have received $1050 from the Permanent Fund's earn-
ings. A person who had migrated to Alaska during the pre-
vious year would have received only $50. In effect, there-
fore, the State told the non-Alaskan: You may establish 
residence in the State, but not upon the same terms enjoyed 
by those who are already resident. Surely this is one of the 
"disabilities of alienage" prohibited by Article IV's Privileges 
and Immunities Clause. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 
180 (1869). 
It could be argued that Alaska's scheme does not trigger 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it discrimi-
nates among classes of residents, rather than between resi-
dents and nonresidents. This argument, however, misin-
terprets the force of Alaska's distribution system. Alaska's 
scheme treats nonresidents who choose to settle in the State 
differently from those who are already residents. The non-
resident contemplating migration to Alaska knows that he 
will never achieve rights equal to those who migrated before 
him. The fact that this discrimination unfolds after the non-
resident establishes Alaskan residency can not mask the fact 
that Alaska's scheme attaches a disability to status (or for-
mer status) as a nonresident. 'l 
' See Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Require-
ments under the Inte1·state P1·ivileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1461, 1464-1465 n. 17 (1979) (labeling contrary argu-
ment "technical"). 
The example of a nonresident contemplating migration to Alaska merely 
illustrates why Alaska's scheme implicates the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause; when a State attempts to classify citizens on the basis of their for-
mer residential status, the Clause also should protect those who moved to 
the State in the past. In this case, for example, appellants settled in 
. -, 
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If the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies to Alaska's 
distribution system, then our prior opinions describe the I 
proper standard of review. In Baldwin v. Fish & Game 
Commission, 436 U. S. 371 (1978), we held that States must 
treat residents and nonresidents "without unnecessary dis-
tinctions" when the nonresident seeks to "engage in an essen-
tial activity or exercise a basic right." I d., at 387. On the 
other hand, if the nonresident engages in conduct that is not 
"fundamental" because it does not "bea[r] upon the vitality of 
the Nation as a single entity," the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause affords no protection. I d., at 387, 383. 
Once the Court ascertains that discrimination burdens an 
"essential activity," it will test the constitutionality of the 
discrimination under a two-part test. First, there must be 
"something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar 
source of the evil at which the statute is aimed." Hicklin v. 
Orbeck, 437 U. S. 518, 525-526 (1978) (quoting Toomer v. 
Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 398 (1948)). Second, the Court must p 
find a "substantial relationship" between the evil(aild the I 
discrimination practiced against the non-citizens. I d., at 
527. 
Certainly the right infringed in this case is "fundamental." 
Alaska's statute burdens those nonresidents who choose to 
settle in the State. 4 It is difficult to imagine a right more 
Alaska before enactment of the statutory scheme they challenge. Al-
though the scheme did not actually deter their migration, the State's deci-
sion to classify citizens on the basis of former residential status still in-
fringes the values protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
For the reasons explored more fully above, I would find that disabilities 
attached to former nonresidential status evoke the same scrutiny applied 
to burdens on current nonresidential status. 
' The "burden" imposed on nonresidents is relative to the benefits en-
joyed by residents. It is immaterial, for purposes of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, that the nonresident may enjoy a benefit in the new 
State that he lacked completely in his former State. The Clause addresses 
only differences in treatment; it does not judge the quality of treatment a 
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essential to the Nation as a whole than the right to establish 
residence in a new State. Just as our federal system permits 
the States to experiment with different social and economic 
programs, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), it allows the individual 
to settle in the State offering those programs best tailored to 
his or her tastes. 5 Alaska's encumbrance on the right of 
nonresidents to settle in that State, therefore, must satisfy 
the dual standard identified in Hicklin. 
Alaska has not shown that its new residents are the "pecu-
liar source" of any evil addressed by its disbursement 
scheme. The State does not argue that recent arrivals con-
stitute a particular source of its population turnover problem. 
Indeed, the State urges that it has a special interest in per-
suading young adults, who have grown to maturity in the 
State, to remain there. Brief for Appellees 35 n. 24. Nor is 
there any evidence that new residents, rather than old, will 
foolishly deplete the State's mineral and financial resources. 6 
State affords citizens and noncitizens. 
' See also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig , Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (the l 
Constitution "was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several 
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and 
salvation are in union and not division"); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 I 
(1869) ("Indeed, without some provision of the kind removing from the citi-
zens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving 
them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would 
have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have con-
stituted the Union which now exists"); Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. \ 
160, 173 (1941) (Constitution prohibits "attempts on the part of any single 
State to isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them by restraining 
the transportation of persons and property across its borders"). I 
6 Alternatively, Alaska argues that its scheme compensates long-term 
residents for their prior tangible and intangible contributions to the State. 
Once again, however, nonresidents are hardly a peculiar source of the 
"evil" of partaking in current largesse without having made prior contribu-
tions. A multitude of native Alaskans-including children and paupers-
may have failed to contribute to the State in past years. Yet the State 
does not dock paupers for their prior failures to contribute. And it awards 
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Even if new residents were the peculiar source of these 
evils, Alaska has not chosen a cure that bears a "substantial 
relationship" to the malady. As the dissenting judges below 
observed, Alaska's scheme gives the largest dividends to res-
idents who have lived longest in the State. The dividends 
awarded to new residents are too small to encourage them to 
stay in Alaska. And the size of these dividends gives new 
residents only a weak interest in prudent management of the 
State's resources. If, therefore, Alaska truly wishes to 
avoid population turnover and depletion of its natural re-
sources, it has chosen a singularly inappropriate means of 
accomplishing that end. 
For these reasons, I conclude that Alaska's disbursement 
scheme violates Article IV's Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. I thus reach the same destination as the Court, but I 
along a course that more precisely identifies the evils of Alas-
ka's scheme. · 
II 
The analysis outlined above applies to many cases in which 
a litigant asserts a right to travel or migrate interstate. 7 To 
every person over the age of 18 dividends equal to the number of years that 
person has lived in the State. 
; Any durational residency requirement, for example, treats nonres-
idents who have exercised their right to settle in a State differently from 
longer-term residents. This is not to say, however, that all such require-
ments would fail scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
The durational residency requirement upheld in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 
393 (1975) (one year to obtain divorce), for example, would have survived 
under the analysis outlined above. In Sosna the State showed that non-
residents were a peculiar source of the evil addressed by its durational resi-
dency requirement. Those persons could misrepresent their attachment 
to Iowa and obtain divorces that would be susceptible to collateral attack in 
other States. Iowa adopted a reasonable response to this problem by re-
quiring nonresidents to demonstrate their bona fide residency for one year 
before obtaining a divorce. I am confident that the analysis developed in 
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historians, this would come as no surprise. Article IV's 
Privileges and Immunities Clause has enjoyed a long associa-
tion with the rights to travel and migrate interstate. 
The Clause derives from Article IV of the Articles of Con-
federation. The latter expressly recognized a right of "free 
ingress and regress to and from any other State," in addition I 
to guaranteeing "the free inhabitants of each of these states 
... the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the sev-
eral states." 8 While the Framers of our Constitution omit-
ted the reference to "free ingress and regress," they retained 
the general guaranty of "privileges and immunities." 
Charles Pinckney, who drafted the current version of Article 
IV, told the Convention that this Article was "formed exactly 
upon the principles of the 4th article of the present Confeder-
ation." 3 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 
112 (1934). Commentators, therefore, have assumed that 
Hicklin v. Orbeck, supra, will adequately identify other legitimate 
durational residency requirements. 
' Even before adoption of the Articles, a few of the colonies explicitly 
protected freedom of movement. The Rhode Island Charter gave mem-
bers of that colony the right "to passe and repasse with freedome, into and 
through the rest of the English Collonies, upon their lawful and civil! occa-
sions." Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, p. 177 
(1956) (hereinafter Chafee). The Massachusetts Body of Liberties pro-
vided: "Every man of or within this Jurisdiction shall have free libertie, not 
with standing any Civil! power, to remove both himselfe and his familie at 
their pleasure out of the same, provided there be no legal! impediment to 
the contrarie." I d., at 178. Massachusetts showed some of the same lib-
erality to foreigners entering the colony: 
"If any people of other Nations professing the true Christian Religion shall I 
flee to us from the Tiranny or oppression of their persecutors, or from 
famyne, warres, or the like necessary and compulsarie cause, They shall be 
entertayned and succoured among us, according to that power and pru-
dence god shall give us." Ibid. I 
These attitudes contrasted with the more restrictive views prevailing in 
seventeenth century Europe. See generally id., at 163-171. 
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the Framers omitted the express guaranty merely because it 
was redundant, not because they wished to excise the right 
from the Constitution. 9 
Early opinions by the Justices of this Court also traced a 
right to travel or migrate interstate to Article IV's Privileges \ 
and Immunities Clause. In Garfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 
546, 552 (No. 3,230) (CC E.D. Pa. 1823), for example, Justice 
Washington explained that the Clause protects the "right of a 
citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other 
state." Similarly, in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 
(1869), the Court found that one of the "undoubt[ed]" effects 
of the Clause was to give "the citizens of each State . . . the 
right of free ingress into other States, and egress from 
them .... " See also Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 
(1871). Finally, in United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 
297-298 (1920), the Court found that the Clause fused two 
distinct concepts: (1) "the right of citizens of the States to re-
side peacefully in, and to have free ingress into and egress 
from" their own States, and (2) the right to exercise the same J 
privileges in other States. 
History, therefore, supports assessment of Alaska's 
scheme, as well as other infringements of the right to travel, 
9 See, e. g., Chafee, supra, at 185; Note, The Right to Travel and E xclu· 
sionary Zon·ing, 26 Hastings L. J. 849, 858--859 (1975); Comment, The 
Right to Travel: In Search of a Constitutional Source, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 
117, 119-120 n. 14 (1975); Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to 
Travel, 22 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 1129, 1130 n. 7 (1975). 
See also Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656, 661 (1975) (Article IV I 
of the Articles of Confederation was "carried over into the comity article of 
the Constitution in briefer form but with no change of substance or intent, 
unless it was to strengthen the force of the Clause in fashioning a single 
nation"); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281, 294 (1920) ("the text of I 
Article IV, § 2, of the Constitution, makes manifest that it was drawn with 
reference to the corresponding clause of the Articles of Confederation and 
was intended to perpetuate its limitations; and ... that view has been so 
conclusively settled as to leave no room for controversy"). I 
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under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. This Clause l 
may not address every conceivable type of discrimination 
that we might denominate a burden on interstate travel. 
Other constitutional guaranties, however, may indepen-
dently restrain discrimination that the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause does not reach. The applicability of different 
constitutional provisions simply reflects the fact that the 
"right to travel" encompasses a variety of rights and a cor-
responding number of potential infringements. 
Unwilling to acknowledge that its result rests upon a con-
stitutionally protected right to travel, the Court avoids dis-
cussing the source and scope of that right. I would confront 
these problems openly and hold that Alaska's distribution 
system violates the Privileges and Immuni ies ause o Ar-
ticle IV by denying non-Alaskans the same residential status 
accorded long-term residents. Accordingly, I concur in the 
Court's judgment insofar as it reverses the judgment of the 
Alaska Supreme Court. 
May 8, 1982 
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